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ABSTRACT 
The first chapter provides evidence on the incidence and distortionary effects 
of taxes on rental properties, using a unique administrative dataset on housing 
transactions in Tehran. I exploit a special feature of the tax code in the Tehran 
rental market where the tax-exemption threshold is based on the property’s size 
(square meters). Large bunching occurs below the tax cutoff, suggesting strong 
behavioral responses to the kink. I also find higher after-tax rents above the kink. 
Based on these variations, I develop a structural framework with property taxes 
and costs of filing to estimate the price elasticities of housing size supply and 
demand simultaneously. I also examine the question of who bears the property tax 
burden. I estimate a mid-run (10-year) price elasticity of housing size supply of 
1.36, and a price elasticity of housing size demand of -0.17. I find high, but 
incomplete pass through of the rental tax - implying that most filing costs are 
borne by renters.  
The second chapter provides new evidence on causal impact of air pollution 
on the housing market. In a co-authored paper, we utilize the dramatic increase in 
the level of air pollution in Tehran, induced by unprecedented international 
sanction regimes imposed on Iran because of their nuclear program in 2010. 
Following some of the sanctions that targeted Iran’s import of gasoline, Iran 
began rapidly to increase its fuel production capacity by converting petrochemical 
plants to gasoline production refineries. The policy caused substantial increase in 
the level of air pollution as a result of the domestically produced low-quality 
gasoline. Using this natural experiment and unique administrative data on 
Tehran’s housing market, we find that a 30 parts-per-billion increase of outdoor 
concentration of Nitrogen Dioxide leads to approximately a 3 to 6 percent 
decrease in housing prices. We also find that higher price-rent ratio is associated 
with lower level of air pollution. Our welfare analysis suggests that air quality 
deteriorations induced by the 2010 gasoline sanctions are associated with $11 to 
$16 billion aggregate reduction in housing values in 2011. 
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CHAPTER 1: BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO THE TAX KINKS IN 
THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM IRAN 
1.1    Introduction 
A large body of literature in public economics estimates structural parameters to 
measure behavioral responses to taxation. The majority of these studies consider the 
supply or demand market in isolation, assuming the other market is perfectly elastic. This 
is more often the case for analysis of the housing market where the relationship between 
property taxes and housing supply is generally neglected (Lutz 2015). Such an 
assumption may result in biased estimation of structural parameters because supply and 
demand responses to taxes are associated with their share of the tax burden, not the full 
burden. This paper develops a structural model to estimate the price elasticities of 
housing size supply and demand simultaneously. Based on these estimates, I answer the 
classic question: “Who bears the property tax burden?” 
A central challenge in estimating separate price elasticities of supply and demand is 
the requirement of observed tax-induced variations in both quantity and price. In the case 
of the latter, it involves the identification of how changes in taxes are split between 
producers and consumers, or the “pass through.” To point out the essential role of pass 
through in determining separate elasticities, consider an example of an increase in the 
taxes on supply that is not fully passed through to be reflected in the price. Since demand 
responses are correlated with the share of the tax burden that falls on them, estimation of 
the price elasticity of demand based on full pass through can be downward biased. Pass 
through hence is a key in determining elasticities, yet it is not straightforward to measure.  
This study examines responses to taxation on rental properties, a common policy 
worldwide, using a special feature of the tax code in Tehran where taxes on owners 
depend on the size of their property. Specifically, the owner’s tax liability becomes 
positive when the total cumulative size of her rental properties exceeds 
150m2(≈1615ft2). This policy was implemented in 2001. Moreover, in Tehran, paying 
rental property taxes requires a specific filing process, different from filing income 
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taxes.1 Owners with zero rental income tax liability are exempted from filing. Therefore, 
costs of filing taxes become positive for owners only if the total size of their rental 
properties surpasses 150𝑚2.2 In this analysis, I use unique administrative dataset that 
include over 600,000 rental and purchasing transactions in Tehran from 2012 to 2014. 
Tehran’s rental market provides an advantageous setting because the quasi-experimental 
variation in rental prices around the cutoff allows for quantifying the extent to which the 
tax burden, including the marginal taxes and filing costs, is passed on to renters.  
To model demand and supply responses to a discrete change in the marginal tax rates 
(a kink) on rental properties of a specific size, which I refer to as the “size kink”, I 
develop a theoretical framework in which taxes are on owners and depend on the size. 
This framework allows for passing forward some of the tax burden to renters via higher 
rents. Moreover, it allows for tax-induced changes in the quantity of properties around 
the size kink. As for the supply responses, I address the hassle costs of complying with 
taxes by assuming that this size kink adds extra costs for filing taxes in addition to 
owners’ tax liability. Therefore, the total tax liability is made up of two elements: the 
fixed costs of filing taxes, and the marginal taxes on rental income. On the demand side, 
renters’ responses to taxation can be identified by assuming that renters only observe 
policy-induced changes in the rental prices above the cutoff. This model predicts that the 
size kink creates an incentive for both owners and renters to move from above the size 
kink, and locate at the tax-favored side – or, in other words, to exhibit “bunching 
behaviors.” I show that the amount of bunching, the filing costs, and the policy-induced 
changes in the rent can characterize price elasticities of housing size supply and demand. 
As for the empirical analysis, I apply the structural model to Tehran rental market to 
identify price elasticities and pass through rates. First, I estimate the discrete increase in 
the rent-value right above the size kink and the change in rent per square meters further 
away from the kink to identify filing costs and rent responses. The quasi-experimental 
design allows for using the average rent of properties below 150m2 as a valid 
                                                          
1 Wage earners are exempt from filing income taxes. 
2 This contrasts with tax systems in majority of developed countries where taxpayers are required to file taxes even if 
they do not owe any taxes. 
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counterfactual for apartments above 150m2. The results present significantly higher rent 
(approximately 3.9 percent) right above the size kink in response to the filing costs. The 
results also show that 1 square meter increase in rent per square meter above the cutoff is 
associated with 3,700 to 4,300 Rials (roughly $1 in 2015 dollars) increase in rent per 
square meter. Second, I estimate the excess bunching, defined as the difference between 
the empirical and counterfactual densities in the small interval below the size kink as in 
Saez (2010) and Kleven and Waseem (2013). The results indicate large bunching below 
the cutoff, suggesting strong behavioral responses to the size kink. I find evidence on 
heterogeneity by age and neighborhoods, with stronger responses for “old apartments” 
and low rent neighborhoods.  
Applying the measures of excess bunching, estimated filling costs, and the rent 
responses to the model for the entire sample, I find significant price elasticities of 
housing size supply, ranging from 0.243 to 0.616, and significant but small in magnitudes 
elasticities of demand, ranging from -0.015 to -0.025. To alleviate the effects of market 
frictions, I use measure of bunching for the sub sample of newly built properties for 
which owners are able to take into account tax policy before choosing the size of their 
properties. While the estimated price elasticities of housing size supply from the 
representative of the “frictionless” market are roughly 2 to 6 times bigger, elasticities of 
housing demand are at least 10 times larger, ranging from 0.172 to 0.365. Estimation of 
the pass-through rate for the frictionless market shows that the majority of the economic 
incidence of taxation is passed on to renters in the form of higher rents.
3
 Overall, the 
results provide clear evidence of bunching, large frictions, and higher after-tax rent, 
governed by the size kink, implying that size-based taxation on rental properties is highly 
regressive and distortionary. 
This paper builds on and contributes to a growing body of literature on the 
distortionary effects of discrete changes in the marginal and proportional taxes. The main 
contribution of this paper is to develop a framework that incorporates pass through of 
                                                          
3 In this study tax-incidence is defined as the ratio between the changes in consumer surplus and the changes in 
producer surplus due to a tax. 
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taxes costs of filing them to simultaneously estimate price elasticities of housing size 
demand and supply that the existing literature analyzes in isolation. 
A recent literature documents behavioral responses to taxes and transfers using 
bunching techniques (Saez 2010; Chetty et al 2011; and Kleven et al 2013). A small body 
of work has also studied sources of frictions, and has pursued different approaches to 
account for them (Chetty et al 2010; Chetty et al. 2011; Chetty 2012; Kleven et al 2013; 
Gelber et al 2014). This literature typically concentrates on one side of the market, 
assuming the other side is perfectly elastic, which implies complete pass through of 
taxes.
4
  This study adds to the existing literature by considering both supply and demand 
responses simultaneously.
5
 This paper also provides quasi-experimental evidence, 
plausibly hinging on fewer modeling assumptions than elsewhere in the literature, 
regarding the effects of frictions on the housing market’s responses to property taxes.   
Another strand of literature to which this paper relates uses transaction taxes to 
analyze behavioral responses to tax policies in the housing market (Kopczuk et. al 2015; 
Slemrod et. al 2015; and Best et. al 2016). This paper departs from this literature by 
focusing on property taxes, which compared to transaction taxes, represent a long-term 
tax commitment, and thus, arguably reveal long-run behavioral responses. Property taxes 
are also one the main sources of governments’ tax revenue.6 In addition, this study 
analyzes the effects of taxes in the rental market, a subject targeted by a variety of urban 
policies, but one that remains understudied by the literature. My findings of strong 
evidence of pass through of taxes to renters imply regressive distributional burden. This 
is different from incidence of transaction taxes (e.g. Besley et al. 2014) where both 
buyers and sellers are arguably from the same quantile of the income distribution.
7
 
Lastly, in contrast to the existing literature that focuses on developed countries (e.g., the 
United States and the United Kingdom), this paper provides evidence of behavioral 
                                                          
4 Saez et al (2012) mentions that studies on payroll taxes and income-tax reform typically assume the full tax burden is 
borne by employees.  
5 Several studies have recently examined supply of housing and urban dynamics. See Green et al (2005), Glaeser et al 
(2006), Epple et al (2010), and Saiz (2010). 
6 In 2012, in the United States, transfer taxes compromise less than 2 percent of the total state tax revenues, while 
property taxes generated over $480 billion dollars (Census Bureau, Quarterly Sum of State and Local Tax Revenue).  
7 In 2014, in the United States, renters’ median income was $33,219, compared to $68,142 for owners (American 
Community Survey Five-Year Estimates). Accessed 7/4/2016. 
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responses to taxes in the housing market for an emerging country where raising tax 
revenue is more of an issue for policy makers.  
A few other studies have documented estimates of the costs of filing taxes.
8
 Benzarti 
(2016) suggests that the total burden of filing income taxes in the United States amounts 
to 1.25 percent of GDP. Kleven et al (2011) model administrative hassle as a 
policymakers’ instrument to screen out individuals with higher opportunity costs. 
Ramnath and Tong (2016) shows that monetary incentives to file tax returns significantly 
increase individuals participation in the tax system and increase their welfare in the long 
run. However, to my knowledge, no literature considers the pass-through burden of filing 
taxes - in particular, for property taxes. My results suggest that the majority of the burden 
of complying with rental property taxes is borne by renters.  
This paper is also related to an important literature on the incidence of property taxes 
(Simon, 1943; Mieszkowski 1972; Hamilton 1976; Fullerton et al 2002; Petrucci 2006). 
Although, a large body of theoretical work attempts to find ways to choose between 
“old,” “benefit,” and “new” views, only a very small body of empirical work addresses 
property taxes’ effects on rental housing (Carroll and Yinger, 1994; Muthitacharoen and 
Zodrow, 2012). To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to combine micro 
administrative data on rental properties with policy-induced quasi-experimental variation 
to analyze the incidence of property taxes. I find renters bear most of the policy’s costs. 
This result is of relevance because in comparison to owners, renters are normally at the 
left side of the income distribution.
9
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data sources and overviews 
the policy. Section 1.3 develops the theoretical framework. Section 1.4 describes the 
empirical methodology. Section 1.5 presents the results, and Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2 Data and Background 
Taxes on rental properties are common around the world, however, tax policy on 
rental properties in Tehran is unusual because the tax depends on both the size of 
                                                          
8 Slemrod (1989) and Benzarti(2016). 
9 Median household income in 2014 (in the United States) was $53,482. 
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properties and their rental income.
10
 This policy was implemented in 2001.  Figure 1.1 
presents the average annual tax paid with respect to size. Taxes are applied to properties 
located at the right side of the solid line; the taxes depend on the extra rental income, 
defined as the annual rental income gained from extra square meters above 150𝑚2. Based 
on regulations enforced by the Iranian National Tax Administration (INTA), the policy is 
progressive, ranging from a low of 15 percent for an extra rental income less than or 
equal to 30 million Rials (approximately $857 in 2015 USD) to a high of 35 percent for 
part of an extra income that is over 1,000 million Rials (approximately $28,571 in 2015 
USD). Paying rental property taxes requires a specific filing process, different from filing 
income taxes and owners with zero rental income tax liability are exempted from filing. 
Table 1.1 shows the percentage of tax that owners pay on their annual rental income for 
each tax bracket in which they qualify. 
The primary data used in this paper are obtained from the Rahbar Informatics 
Services Company (RISC). Since 2009, the law requires all purchasing and rental 
transactions to be registered online.
11
 Nearly all rental properties in Tehran are owned 
individually. Therefore, an owner typically leases her rental property through real estate 
agencies. If the owner and renter reach an agreement, the real estate agent will fill out 
specific forms online, including information such as rent or price, full address of the unit, 
size, age, ZIP Code, and date of contract.
12
 I also used records on historical real estate 
listings in Tehran that come from Iranfile website, which is the largest real estate portal 
in Iran.
13
 These records contain rich details of each listing, including the number of 
stories in the building, number of units in each floor, facing direction of the unit, kitchen 
materials (e.g., steel, wood, MDF, etc.), flooring (e.g. parquet, stone, ceramic, carpet, 
etc.), building façade materials, years since construction, floor number, number of 
bedrooms.
14
 
                                                          
10 Law of direct taxes 53-11 (http://download.tax.gov.ir/GeneralDownloads/DirectTaxLaw.pdf) Accessed 7/24/2016 
11 http://www.iranamlaak.ir/Files/TasvibNameh.aspx 
12 Although personal information of the owner (seller) and tenant (buyer) are recorded, for reasons of confidentiality 
the provided data do not include this information. See Appendix A for more detail.  
13 www.iranfile.ir 
14 It also has information on number of phone lines, number of parking, storage, and balcony, type of heating/cooling 
system, and whether the building has elevator, yard, backyard, pool, sauna, and Jacuzzi. 
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Since owners of two or more rental properties respond to the size kink at 150𝑚2 
based on the total combined size of all their properties, one potential concern is that the 
observed distribution of properties does not capture all behavioral responses. The reason 
is that the multiple-rental-property owners remain unresponsive to the size kink 
at 150𝑚2. However, the aggregate data on homeownership in Tehran shows that only 4 
percent of rental properties belong to owners who possess more than one property.
15
 
Therefore, their impacts on my estimations are negligible. 
The raw data include 278,473 rental and 371,904 purchasing observations during the 
years 2012 – 2014. In the final data, I exclude transactions for which complete 
information is not available along with all nonresidential and non-apartment 
transactions.
16
 Observations that the district number does not match with the Zip Code, 
possibly due to data-entering mistakes, are excluded as well. Moreover, to rule out the 
effects of outliers, I trim observations where the rent and price per square meter are in the 
least 1 percent and beyond the 99 percent levels. The final sample includes 243,144 rental 
and 344,774 purchasing observations from 2012 to 2014. Figure 2 shows the distribution 
of observations across Tehran to examine whether the RISC dataset is representative of 
the universe of properties in Tehran.  As can be seen in Figure 1.2, each panel contains at 
least 2,800 housing observations for each of the 22 districts, indicating that the data are 
representative of nearly all neighborhoods.
17
 
Another concern is misreporting of size by owners in order to evade taxation. 
Because owner-occupied units are exempted from taxation, there is no clear incentive for 
owners to misreport the size when they sell their properties.
18
 Therefore, one way to test 
for misreporting is to check whether the reported sizes match in both rental and 
purchasing data. In doing so, I merge the two datasets on the basis of 10-digit ZIP Code, 
district, and floor number. The matched data, composed of the high-quality matches that 
                                                          
15 Rahbar Informatics Services Company (RISC) has provided this number by summarizing number of different rental 
transactions in each year for each owner, using owner’s unique identification number. 
16 An apartment in this study is defined as a unit that is owned individually, which is very similar to the definition of a 
condo in the U.S. housing market.  
17 Tehran is divided into 22 different districts. 
18 Misreporting the size of his rental property at the time of sale is a possible but difficult undertaking for an owner. 
The seller, buyer and real estate agent have to agree. Moreover, the average price of more than $1,000 per-square-meter 
serves as a disincentive for the seller to report a size that is smaller than the correct one. 
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result via this method, include 64,677 unique observations. I focus on properties in the 
proximity of the size kink (140𝑚2, 150𝑚2], where the probability of misreporting is 
expected to be high. The matched data reveal that for over 87 percent of observations the 
reported size for the rental transaction is exactly the same as for the purchased one. More 
importantly, for only 4 percent of rental observations in (140𝑚2, 150𝑚2] is the reported 
size for the purchasing transactions over 150𝑚2, which suggests that owners do not 
strategically underreport the size of their rental properties.  
Table 2 shows summary statistics for rental transactions. Although median size is 
well below the cutoff (150𝑚2), several thousand rental transactions are within 10𝑚2 of 
the size-threshold. The jump in the average rent-value per square meter right above the 
size-threshold is evident here, as is the dwindling number of observations. Note that, 
median age of properties is 11 years, which implies the majority of constructions are 
fairly new in Tehran.  
1.3 Theoretical Framework   
This section describes a model of behavioral responses to taxation in the rental-
housing market; this motivates and underlies the empirical analysis. I first develop a 
static model with cost of filing to measure the owners’ responses to a size kink (i.e. an 
increase in the marginal tax rates on rental properties at specific size). Second, to 
calculate price elasticity of housing size demand, I construct a model for renters, who 
optimize their utility based on housing consumption and rent price. I follow with 
describing the connection between price elasticities and tax-incidence, and pass-through 
rates.  
1.3.1 Setup 
Consider two types of individuals, owners (providers) and renters (tenants). Each 
owner owns a rental property and chooses how much housing services (square meter) to 
provide to maximize her profits. Size of an apartment, which denoted by 𝑠, represents 
units of housing services. The gross equilibrium rent per unit of size is denoted by 𝑅.19 
                                                          
19 In this study, each unit of size is one square meter. 
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Therefore, owner of a rental property with size 𝑠 receives total rent of 𝑠𝑅. This analysis 
allows for heterogeneity on the costs of providing housing services at rent R. Owners 
provide housing services using composite materials 𝑀 and land-factor 𝐿 according to the 
production function 𝑆(𝑀, 𝐿) = 𝑘𝑀𝛿𝐿1−𝛿, where 𝑘 is a productivity parameter with a 
smooth density distribution 𝑔(𝑘).20 Intuitively, the productivity parameter controls for 
qualitative differences such as age, land characteristics, and location across rental 
properties. Rewriting all variables on a per-unit of land basis, let 𝑠(𝑚) = 𝑘𝑚𝛿, where 
𝑚 = 
𝑀
𝐿
. The owner’s profit per unit of land is then given by:21 
 𝜋(𝑠) = 𝑠𝑅 − 𝑝𝑚𝑚− 𝑝𝑙     (1.1) 
where 𝑝𝑚 is price per unit of materials factors, and 𝑝𝑙 is land factor price. Replacing 𝑚 
with (𝑠 𝑘⁄ )
1
𝛿
 and normalizing 𝑝𝑚 to 1, the owner’s profit function can be described by:  
𝜋(𝑠) = 𝑠𝑅 − (
𝑠
𝑘
)
1
𝛿
− 𝑝𝑙    
Suppose that a discrete increase in the marginal tax rate (a kink) is introduced at the 
size s∗, meaning that owners of rental properties larger than s∗ pay taxes on the marginal 
rental income gained from the extra square meters above the s∗. In response to the size 
kink, each owner relocates to the new optimal size in the presence of taxes to maximize 
her profits, but must pay adjustment cost ψ, which for now I assume ψ = 0.22 Moreover, 
assume that paying taxes adds extra filing costs on owners, denoted by 𝜑. Intuitively, the 
costs of filing taxes capture the aversion to filing taxes, time costs, record keeping, and 
tax-preparers’ fees. Since the assumption is that owners with zero tax liability do not 
need to file any taxes, 𝜑 = 0 for properties sized below or equal 𝑠∗. 
                                                          
20 It can be shown that given a smooth tax system, the smooth productivity distribution implies a smooth distribution of 
properties w.r.t size.  
21 For the sake of simplicity, I just consider one period by assuming that discount rate for rental income 𝛽 = 0. 
Considering a richer model with 𝛽 ≠ 0 only complicates the analysis, and it does not change the quantitative 
conclusion.  
22 Think of it as an owner selling his current rental property and buying another property of an optimal size where 
search costs of selling and buying are negligible. In practice, the adjustment costs are lower for newly built and very 
old properties. In the case of former, an owner has the opportunity to take into account the effects of tax policy before 
choosing the optimal size of her rental property. In the case of latter, the opportunity costs of demolishing properties 
and replacing them with properties smaller than the size kink are arguably lower for owners of old properties. 
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1.3.2 Elasticity of Housing Supply  
A size kink imposes tax liabilities and filing costs to owners, which can be shifted 
forward to renters (i.e. pass through). Let’s consider a pass-through of filing costs 𝜑 and 
tax liability to renters via discrete increase in the total rent for properties sized above 𝑠∗, 
and change in rent per unit of size from 𝑅0 to 𝑅1 for extra size above the cutoff. Hence, 
profits conditional on size are given by:  
 
{
 
 
 
 𝜋(𝑠) = 𝑠𝑅0 − (
𝑠
𝑘
)
1
𝛿
− 𝑝𝑙                                                                         𝑖𝑓  𝑠 ≤ 𝑠
∗
 
𝜋(𝑠) = [𝑠 − 𝑠∗]𝑅1(1 − 𝜏) + 𝑠
∗𝑅0 − (
𝑠
𝑘
)
1
𝛿
− 𝑝𝑙 − (1 − 𝛾)𝜑              𝑖𝑓 𝑠 > 𝑠
∗
 (1.2) 
where 𝑅0 is gross rent per unit of size for properties with 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠
∗, 𝑅1 is gross rent per unit 
of size for extra size above 𝑠∗, 𝜑 is the hassle costs of filing taxes, and 𝛾 is the portion of 
the filing costs burden that is passed forward to renters – the pass through rates. Note that 
for properties larger than 𝑠∗, the first term in equation (1.2) arises from after-tax rental 
income gained from extra square meters above 𝑠∗. The last term arises from the net of 
costs of filing taxes that create a pure discontinuity in profits level at the size kink. 
Optimizing the profit functions over size yields the following supply functions: 
 
{
𝑠 =  𝑘
1
1−𝛿[𝑅0𝛿]
𝜀𝑠                    𝑖𝑓 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠∗
 
𝑠 =  𝑘
1
1−𝛿[𝑅1(1 − 𝜏)𝛿]
𝜀𝑠      𝑖𝑓 𝑠 > 𝑠∗
 (1.3) 
where the elasticity of housing supply in terms of size with respect to the gross rent is 
given by 𝜀𝑠 = 
𝛿
1−𝛿
. Figure 1.3 illustrates the implication of this size kink in a production 
function diagram. Introduction of a size kink creates a discontinuity in the Iso-profit 
curve at 𝑠∗ and make it steeper for 𝑠 >  𝑠∗.23 24 This gap in the Iso-profit curves at 𝑠∗ 
                                                          
23 The assumption here is  𝑅1(1 − 𝜏) ≤  𝑅0 and 𝛾 ≤ 1, implying that the magnitude of pass through is less than or 
equal the total tax burden. This analysis does not consider the case of over shifting, assuming that owners do not have 
market power, which is confirmed by data.  
24
 To also see why the production functions s = 𝑓(𝑚), and Iso-profit curves are tangent at the optimal points, consider 
maximization of 𝜋(𝑠) over size for 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠∗. The first order condition (FOC) yields: 𝑅0 = [𝑓
−1(𝑠)]′ in which 
[𝑓−1(𝑠)]′ = 1 𝑓′(𝑚)⁄ . Therefore, production function’s derivative at the optimal size is equal to: 
1
R0
⁄ . Similarly, right 
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means owners who would have chosen their rental properties in the range (𝑠∗, 𝑠∗ + ∆𝑠) in 
the absence of the size kink can optimize their profits by providing less housing services 
and bunch at 𝑠∗. Owner 𝐿𝐴 has the lowest productivity, 𝑘𝐿𝐴, among those who 
choose 𝑠 = 𝑠∗. She would provide 𝑠∗ both in the presence and absence of the size kink. 
Owner 𝐻𝐴 has the highest productivity 𝑘𝐻𝐴 among those who bunch at the 𝑠
∗. She would 
provide 𝑠∗ +  Δ𝑠 when there is no size kink. In the presence of the size kink, she is 
indifferent between supplying 𝑠∗ and 𝑠𝐼. All owners with productivity parameters in the 
range (𝑘𝐿𝐴, 𝑘𝐻𝐴) will bunch at the cutoff.
25
 For the marginal bunching individual, using 
the FOC condition from equation (1.3), we have 𝑠𝐼 = 𝑘𝐻
1
1−𝛿[𝑅1(1 − 𝜏)𝛿]
𝛿
1−𝛿. Replacing it 
in equation (1.2) yields: 
 
{ 
𝜋∗ = 𝑅0𝑠
∗ − (
𝑠∗
𝑘𝐻𝐴
)
1
𝛿⁄
− 𝑝𝑙                                                                                         
𝜋𝐼 = 𝑘𝐻𝐴
1
1−𝛿[𝑅1(1 − 𝜏)]
1
1−𝛿𝛿
𝛿
1−𝛿[1 − 𝛿]− 𝑠∗𝑅1(1 − τ) − 𝑝𝑙 − (1 − 𝛾)𝜑
 (1.4) 
In the absence of the size kink, the marginal buncher would choose an apartment with 
size (𝑠∗ + ∆𝑠) that implies 𝑘𝐻𝐴
1
1−𝛿 = 
𝑠∗+Δ𝑠
[𝛿𝑅0]
𝛿
1−𝛿⁄
 . Replacing 𝑘𝐻𝐴 in equation (4) and from 
the condition 𝜋∗ = 𝜋𝐼, the relationship between price elasticity of housing size supply, 
rent responses, filing costs, and bunching can be written as follows:
26
 
 1
(1 + 
Δ𝑠
𝑠∗)
[(1 + 
Δ𝑅
𝑅0
) (1 −  𝜏)
+
𝜑(1 − 𝛾)
𝑠∗𝑅0
 ]  − 
1
1 + 𝜀𝑠
[(1 + 
Δ𝑅
𝑅0
) (1 −  𝜏)]
1+𝜀𝑠
− 
1
1 +
1
𝜀𝑠
(
1
(1 + 
Δ𝑠
𝑠∗)
)
1+
1
𝜀𝑠
= 0 
      
(1.5) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
above the cutoff (𝑠 >  𝑠∗), the slope of iso-profit curves are 1 𝑅1(1 − 𝜏)
⁄  and from the FOC condition we have 
𝑅1(1 − 𝜏) = [𝑓
−1(𝑠)]′ = 1 𝑓′(𝑚)⁄ .   
25 Note that the above analysis is concentrated on intensive margin responses and cannot identify extensive margin 
responses. Kleven and Waseem (2013) and Best and Kleven (2015) show that extensive margin responses converges to 
zero in the vicinity of the cutoff.   
26 Check appendix for the details. 
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To solve equation (1.5) for 𝜀𝑠, we need to estimate the size responses Δ𝑠, the pass 
through rate 𝛾, the filing costs 𝜑, the base rent 𝑅0, and the rent responses ∆𝑅. The 
remaining parameters 𝑠∗ and 𝜏 are directly observable. Size responses Δ𝑠 can be 
estimated using total amount of bunching (Saez 2010) - that is number of owners who 
decide to locate at s∗ after the introduction of the size kink:  
 
𝐵 = ∫ ℎ(𝑠)
𝑠∗+∆𝑠
𝑠∗
𝑑𝑠 ≈ ℎ(𝑠∗)∆𝑠  (1.6) 
where ℎ(𝑠∗) is the counterfactual density of 𝑠 under the assumption of no taxation at 𝑠∗. 
This approximation assumes that ℎ(𝑠) is roughly constant around the bunching interval. 
Hence, by estimating the amount of bunching 𝐵 and the counterfactual density ℎ(𝑠∗) at 
the size-threshold, I can numerically solve for Δ𝑠. Section 1.3.4 explains the relationship 
between price elasticities of housing supply and demand and the pass through rates. 
Section 1.4.1 describes the empirical methodology for estimating 𝐵 and ℎ(𝑠∗). Section 
1.4.2 describes the identification strategy to estimate rent responses and cots of filing.  
1.3.3 Elasticity of Housing Demand 
As for the demand model, individuals’ preferences only depend on the consumption, 
which is divided into two groups: consumption of housing and composition of all other 
goods. Consumption of other goods equals the total income net of rent. Size is used as a 
proxy for housing consumption. Given all other variables, a larger property provides 
higher utility for a renter. These individual preferences are represented by a quasi-linear 
and iso-elastic utility function:  
 
𝑈(𝑐, 𝑠) = 𝑐 +
𝛼
1 +
1
𝜀𝑑
(
𝑠
𝛼
)
1+
1
𝜀𝑑
 (1.7) 
where 𝑐 is the consumption of market goods, 𝑠 is the size of the apartment, and 𝛼 is the 
housing preferences. The quasi-linearity assumption rules out the income effects, thus, 
the elasticity of housing size demand 𝜀𝑑, reflects only the substitution effects in response 
13 
 
to rent changes induced by the size kink.
27
 Iso-elasticity assumption implies that elasticity 
of demand is constant. Renters spend their entire income on rent and the composite good, 
that is to say, 𝑦 = 𝑠𝑅 + 𝑐. Plugging the budget constraint into equation (1.7), we have: 
 
𝑈(𝑐, 𝑠) = 𝑦 − 𝑠𝑅 +
𝛼
1 +
1
𝜀𝑑
(
𝑠
𝛼
)
1+
1
𝜀𝑑
 (1.8) 
A renter’s utility maximization problem with respect to size leads to the following 
equation: 
 𝑠 = 𝛼(𝑅)𝜀𝑑 (1.9) 
which demonstrates the negative relationship between gross rent and property size as 
long as the compensated elasticity is negative.  
Although statutory incidence of taxes is on owners, renters bear part of the incidence 
that is passed into the rent. Let’s consider a pass through of the tax burden in the form of 
discrete increase in the total rent (equals to 𝛾𝜑) at 𝑠∗, and changes in the rent per unit of 
size from 𝑅0 to 𝑅1 for extra size above 𝑠
∗. Therefore, her budget constraint for above the 
cutoff is: 𝑦 = 𝑠∗𝑅0 + (𝑠 − 𝑠
∗)𝑅1 +  𝛾𝜑 + 𝑐. The discontinuity and nonlinearity in the 
budget constraint at the right side of the size kink creates incentive for renters to locate at 
𝑠∗ to increase the utility level. Figure 1.4 illustrates the mechanism, assuming 
heterogeneous housing preferences among individuals. Renter 𝐿 with the lowest 
preferences 𝛼𝐿 among those who bunch at the tax-cutoff, would choose 𝑠∗ both in the 
absence and presence of the size kink.  Renter 𝐻, the marginal bunching individual with 
highest preferences 𝛼𝐻, is indifferent between 𝑠𝐼 and 𝑠∗ in the presence of the size kink. 
Her optimal choice in the absence of the size kink would be 𝑠∗ + ∆𝑠. All renters with 
preferences between (𝛼𝐿 , 𝛼𝐻), who would rent properties with size in the range (𝑠∗, 𝑠∗ +
 ∆𝑠), bunch at the size kink. Using the FOC condition from equation (1.8), we have 
𝑠𝐼 = 𝛼𝐻(𝑅1)
𝜀𝑑. Hence, her utility level at 𝑠∗ and 𝑠𝐼 are: 
                                                          
27 Saez(2010) explains that income effects are negligible when changes in the marginal tax rates are small because 
income effects depend on the average tax rates.  
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{
  
 
  
 𝑢𝐼 = 𝑦 − 𝛼𝐻(𝑅1)
1+𝜀𝑑 + 𝑠∗∆𝑅 − 𝛾𝜑 + 
𝛼𝐻
1 +
1
𝜀𝑑
(𝑅1)
1+𝜀𝑑 = 𝑦 + 𝑠∗∆𝑅 − 𝛾𝜑 +
𝛼𝐻
1 + 𝜀𝑑
(𝑅1)
1+𝜀𝑑
𝑢∗ =  𝑦 − 𝑅0. 𝑠
∗ +
𝛼𝐻
1 +
1
𝜀𝑑
(
𝑠∗
𝛼𝐻
)
1+
1
𝜀𝑑
                                                                                                      
 (1.10) 
In the absence of the size kink, individual 𝐻 would choose a property with size  
(𝑠∗ + ∆𝑠), which implies 𝛼𝐻 = 𝑠
∗ + Δs
𝑅0
𝜀𝑑⁄ . Replacing 𝛼
𝐻 in the utility functions and 
using the condition 𝑢∗ = 𝑢𝐼, the price elasticity of housing demand can be written as an 
implicit function of size responses, and the change in the average rent: 
 
(
1
1 +
∆𝑠
𝑠∗
) [(1 +
∆𝑅
𝑅0
) −
𝛾𝜑
𝑠∗𝑅0
] − 
1
1 +
1
𝜀𝑑
(
1
1 +
∆𝑠
𝑠∗
)
1+
1
𝜀𝑑
− 
1
1 + 𝜀𝑑
(1 +
∆𝑅
𝑅0
)
1+𝜀𝑑
= 0 
(1.11) 
Upon market clearing assumption, the rent response, total volume of bunching, and 
size response are the same from both supply and demand perspectives. Therefore, using 
the same measure of rent and size responses from the previous section, we can 
numerically solve for 𝜀𝑑. 
1.3.4 Pass Through and Incidence 
Under perfect competition, the pass through –  marginal changes in prices due to a 
change in taxes - is a function of the relative elasticities of supply and demand (Weyl and 
Fabinger 2013): 
 
𝛾 =  
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝜏
 =  
1
1 + (
𝜀𝑑
𝜀𝑠
)
 (1.12) 
where 𝑃 is the after-tax price. This equation intuitively means that the greater the price 
elasticity of one side of the market is, the more the tax burden is borne by the other side.
28
 
                                                          
28 Note that under imperfect competition, calculation of pass through requires more information about the market 
structure and demand curvature (Ganapati et al. 2016). 
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Pass through itself is a key parameter to determine incidence ratio (𝐼), defined as the ratio 
between the changes in consumer surplus (renters) and the changes in producer surplus 
(owners). Applying the envelop theorem to the consumers, a decrease in the consumer 
surplus (renters) due to an increase in a tax is equal to the product of equilibrium quantity 
𝑄∗, and 𝛾. Similarly, applying the envelop theorem to producers, the reduction in 
producer surplus (owners) is equal to 𝑄∗ times the change in producers’ price 1 − 𝛾. 
Therefore, we have: 
 
𝐼 =
𝑑𝐶𝑆 𝑑𝜏⁄
𝑑𝑃𝑆 𝑑𝜏⁄
=
𝛾
1 − 𝛾
 (1.13) 
where 𝐶𝑆 is the consumer surplus and 𝑃𝑆 is the producer surplus.29 Intuitively incidence 
larger than one means the majority of the tax burden is borne by the demand side of the 
market. Therefore, under perfect competition, the relative elasticity of supply and demand 
can fully characterize the pass-through rates and tax incidence.  
To numerically solve for 𝜀𝑠 and 𝜀𝑑, I use an iterative method with an initial guess for 
the pass through rate 𝛾. This method generate successive approximations to solve 
equation (1.5) and (1.11), by updating 𝛾 using the previous approximations of 𝜀𝑠 and 𝜀𝑑.  
1.4 Empirical Methodology 
This section presents the empirical methodology for the identification of excess 
bunching 𝐵, rent responses ∆𝑅, and filing costs 𝜑 around the size kink; the parameters 
required to estimate structural elasticities. 
1.4.1 Estimation of Excess Bunching 
The difference between the empirical and counterfactual densities around the size 
kink provides a measure of excess bunching. To recover the counterfactual density, 
defined as the density of rental properties w.r.t size in the absence of the size kink, I fit a 
smooth polynomial to the empirical density and exclude the observations around the kink 
that are affected by the tax policy (Kleven and Waseem 2013). The reason is that in the 
                                                          
29 These analyses are based on the assumption of infinitesimal changes in tax rates (begin from zero).    
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presence of the size kink, individuals in the range (𝑠∗, 𝑠∗ + Δ𝑠) cluster at the left side of 
the size kink in the range (𝑠,𝑠∗].30 Therefore, apartments are grouped into small size bins 
(i.e., 1 square meter) and estimate the following regression:  
        
𝑁𝑖 = ∑𝛽𝑗(𝑠𝑖)
𝑗 +∑𝜗𝜐. 1[
𝑠𝑖
5
∈ 𝑁]
 
𝜐∈𝑉
 +  ∑ 𝜃𝑗 . 1[𝑠𝑖 = 𝑡 ]
𝑠∗+Δ𝑠
𝑡=𝑠
+ 𝜈𝑖
𝑝
𝑗=0
 (1.14) 
where 𝑁𝑖 is the number of apartments in bin 𝑖, 𝑠𝑖 is the size-level in bin 𝑖, 𝑝 is the order 
of the polynomial, and  𝜗𝜐 is a vector of dummy variables that controls for rounding 
effects.  One possible concern is that owners may tend to register the properties’ size in 
round numbers, which can cause spikes at multiples of 5 and 10 in the empirical 
distribution.  Hence, dummy variables are added for multiples of 5 into equation (1.14) to 
capture the rounding effect. The counterfactual density is the fitted value of the 
dependent variable from equation (1.14), excluded from the estimated values of dummies 
in the affected range, that is: 
 
?̂?𝑖 = ∑?̂?𝑗(𝑠𝑖)
𝑗 +∑?̂?𝜐. 1[
𝑠𝑖
5
∈ 𝑁]
 
𝜐∈𝑉
 
𝑝
𝑗=0
 (1.15) 
As mentioned above, excess bunching is the difference between empirical and 
counterfactual densities for a range (𝑠, 𝑠∗], that is: ?̂? =  ∑ (𝑁𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖)
𝑠∗
𝑖=𝑠 .
31
 
32
 The standard 
errors for excess bunching are estimated using the bootstrap method.  
1.4.2 Estimating Rent Responses and Cost of Filing Taxes 
As mentioned in the theoretical section, if owners can pass forward some of the 
burden of filing costs to renters, the expectation is to observe a discrete increase in total 
rent right above the size kink. Similarly, an increase marginal tax rates above the cutoff 
                                                          
30 In practice, excess bunching doesn’t occur at one point, instead, it is spread over a tiny band (𝑠𝐿, 𝑠
∗]. The optimal 
bunching segment is the one that the difference between the counterfactual and empirical distribution is minimum.  
31 One concern is that this method does not consider the shifting of the observed distributions above s∗ + Δs to the right 
of the cutoff. However, Kleven (2016) describes that these effects are negligible in many applications, in particular, if 
the observed distribution is not steep. 
32 Note that if the number of owners with more than one rental property is significantly high, the estimated bunching 
underrepresents the true level; in this case my estimation of elasticities will be lower bound. However, in this sample, 
only 4 percent of properties belong to owners with more than one property. 
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can be shifted forward to renters in the form of higher rent per square meter for extra size 
above the cutoff. Figure 1.5 graphically shows how the treatment effect is identified 
using evidence from data. Comparison between the mean annual rent at the left and right 
side of the size kink, presented in Panel A, provides clear evidence of a spike in rent 
payments for properties that are located right above the size kink. The figures provide 
evidence that a policy-induced spike exists in rent payments at the cut-off, however, to 
test this hypothesis, I estimate the following regression:  
 (𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡/𝑚2)𝑖 =
 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑖 × (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 − 150𝑚
2) +𝛽2(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 − 150𝑚
2) +
𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒
2
𝑖 + 𝑍𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 + 𝑡 + 𝑄 + 𝜀𝑖  
(1.16) 
where (𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡/𝑚2)𝑖 is the annual real rent per square meter for apartment 𝑖. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝐴𝑔𝑒, and  
𝐴𝑔𝑒2control for the characteristics of the rental properties. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑘 is a dummy 
variable equal to one for properties larger than 150𝑚2, zero otherwise. Interaction of 
SizeKink with (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 − 150) captures the change in the slope of rent per square meter 
above 150𝑚2. ZIP Code-level fixed effects are added to control for the neighborhood 
characteristics. In Iran, the 10-digits ZIP Code locates an address precisely. The first 5 
digits of a ZIP Code can properly determine the neighborhood boundaries, which 
typically contain several blocks.
33
 The data cover 2,601 neighborhoods in Tehran. Year 
fixed-effects 𝑡, control for business cycles and macroeconomic variables that may affect 
the overall rental housing market. Seasonal fixed effects 𝑄, control for seasonal patterns 
in the rental market.
34
 
The main coefficient of interest in equation (1.16) is β0 that captures the differences 
of rent value between properties above and below the cutoff due to the pass through of 
the filing costs. The other coefficient of interest is β1 that capture the effects of marginal 
taxes on rent per square meter above the cutoff point. The coefficient of SizeKink, β0, 
will do a better job in capturing the effects of filing costs around the cutoff because tax 
liability is very small.  On the other hand, as the size gets further away from the cutoff, 
                                                          
33 A block is defined as the smallest area surrounded by four streets. 
34 The Box-𝐶𝑜𝑥 lambda transformation for my specification shows that qualitatively linear transformation is a better 
choice compared to log-log and log-linear transformations. The transformation parameter is 0.62. 
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the tax liability becomes larger and  β1 can capture the effects of marginal taxes more 
precisely. Therefore, we estimate equation (1.16) for different samples: the entire sample, 
a sample that only include observations around the cutoff, and a sample that exclude the 
bunching area.  
1.5. Results 
1.5.1 Graphical Evidence 
Figure 1.6 illustrates the distribution of rental properties with respect to size for the 
entire sample (panel A) and newly built properties (panel B) between March 2012 and 
September 2014 by bins of 5𝑚2. 35 The size kink is denoted by a dashed line, which itself 
belongs to the tax-zero side of the kink.  Two elements are worth noting in these panels. 
First, there is clear evidence of bunching right below the tax-exemption threshold, 
followed by a substantial drop in the number of properties above it. Second, sharper 
bunching at the kink point surfaces in the distribution of newly built properties for which 
owners have already taken into account the tax policy before choosing the size of their 
apartments.
36
 This is consistent with the optimization friction theory of Kleven and 
Waseem (2013) that predicts larger responses in frictionless markets compared to the 
ones observed in the presence of frictions. Sample of newly built properties is a suitable 
representative of a frictionless market because the adjustment costs of choosing the 
optimal size are much smaller for owners, who purchase them for leasing.  This also 
implies that more responsive supply leads to stronger bunching at the size kink.
37
  
Exploiting the longitudinal feature of the dataset, Figure 1.7 breaks down the full 
sample of properties into three consecutive years, 2012-2014, to illustrate the dynamics 
of bunching behaviors.
38
 While all three panels show substantial bunching at 150𝑚2, the 
contrast between panel A (year: 2012) and panel C (year: 2014) is still striking, 
suggesting that behavioral responses are magnified over time. One way of thinking about 
                                                          
35 Newly built properties are defined as those for which the “year since construction” is zero at the time of transaction. 
36 The reduction in the number of apartments that occurs by moving from the bin (145m2, 150m2] to the bin 
(150m2, 155m2] is 59 percent for panel B, versus 52 percent for panel A. 
37 Appendix Figure A.1 illustrates the distribution of rental properties with respect to size for the entire sample by bins 
of 3m2. Appendix Figure A.2 shows the distribution of properties using the matched data described in Section 1.2. 
38 Data are broken down into a three-year period based on Iranian calendar in which the new year starts on March 21st. 
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this transition is that the stock of existing properties, i.e. properties that were built before 
the implementation of tax-regulation (2001), decreases through time.
39
 The share of 
existing properties for each year, presented in Table 1.3, demonstrates that sharper 
bunching is associated with the reduced share of existing stock.  
To explicitly verify that the tax policy induces bunching, Figure 1.8 presents the 
comparison of the density of apartments that were constructed before the tax-regulation 
and newly built apartments in the owner-occupant market. Sample of newly built 
properties here is reduced to observations from 2014, which have the furthest time-
distance from the tax implementation date.
40
 The focus here is on the owner-occupant 
market that is not subject to the property taxes (as opposed to the rental market). As in the 
figure, for properties built before the introduction of the regulation, the density smoothly 
decreases over size and there is no evidence of systematic clustering below the size kink. 
Moreover, the absence of evident bunching in the density of old properties helps to rule 
out alternative explanations for bunching at the focal point. In fact, properties in both 
graphs are similar in all respects except age. In contrast, distribution of newly built 
properties in 2014 provides clear evidence of bunching at the size kink.   
1.5.2 Estimation of Rent Responses and filing costs 
I estimate equation (1.16) to measure the rent responses to the tax in Tehran rental 
market. Under the null hypothesis of no tax policy effects on rent, the coefficients on the 
dummy variable for size, 𝛽0, and the interaction term, 𝛽1,  in equation (1.16) are zero: 
owners of properties larger than 150𝑚2 cannot shift forward the burden of filing costs 
and marginal taxes to renters through higher rent. On the other hand, as long as supply is 
not perfectly inelastic, the prediction is that the size kink creates a spike in the rent value 
right above the tax-cutoff, followed by linear increase in rent per square meter afterward. 
Table 1.4 presents the OLS estimates of 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 for various versions of equation 
(1.16). All specifications include year, seasonal, and 5-digit ZIP Code fixed effects. 
                                                          
39
 Here, I count an apartment as existing if it has been completely constructed before 2004, assuming that those 
between 2001 and 2003 had already been partly built at the time of the change in the regulation. However, changing the 
cut-off criteria from 2004 to 2003 or 2002 does not noticeably affect the graphs or results. 
40 Appendix Figure A.3 shows the distribution of newly built apartments for all years 2012 – 2014. 
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Results for the entire sample, presented in Columns (1) and (2), suggest that introduction 
of the size kink at 150𝑚2 lead to discrete increase in the rent value, and positive change 
in rent per square meter for each extra square meter above the cutoff. The positive and 
significant coefficients for 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 imply that some of the tax burden is passed forward 
to renters. Column (3) and (4) present the results for the sample that removes 
observations in the range (140𝑚2, 160𝑚2). The point estimate of the interaction term in 
column (4) is larger in magnitude, suggesting that the effects of marginal taxes on rent 
per square meter tend to enhance further away from the cutoff.  
Column (5) and (6) report estimates from specifications that restrict the sample to 
only include observations within 10 square meters of the cutoff.  This restriction 
plausibly isolates the effects of filing costs on rent.
41
 The results in column (5) and (6), 
which are not significantly different from their counterparts in column (3) and (4), show 
that the burden of filing taxes is associated with a 140,000(approximately $3.9 in 2015 
dollars) Rials increase in rent per square meter.
42
 Considering average rent per square 
meter of 3,600,000 Rials (approximately $100 in 2015 dollars) per square meter below 
the cutoff, this number can be translated to 3.9 percent increase in rent value right above 
the cutoff. This is also consistent with findings of Benzarti (2016) and Ramnath and Tong 
(2017) that show individuals compromise significant amount of money to avoid burden 
of filing taxes.   
1.5.3 Estimation of Excess Bunching  
Figure 1.9 presents the results of excess bunching by comparing the empirical and 
counterfactual distributions of properties with respect to size for different samples. 
Counterfactual distributions in all panels are estimated based on equation (1.14). Panel A 
shows the results for the entire sample. Panel B focuses on newly built properties in the 
rental market where greater bunching is happening arguably due to more elastic supply. 
Panel C, on the other hand, presents the same graphs in the owner-occupant market by 
combining purchasing transactions of newly built properties for years 2012 to 2014. Each 
                                                          
41
 This restriction also rules out the alternative explanation that observations with both large size and high rents are 
driving the results. 
42 Wald test results cannot reject the null hypotheses of restricting the point estimates in column (4) and (6) to be the 
same.  
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panel shows the estimation of excess bunching which is defined as the proportion of 
excess bunching to the counterfactual frequency in the small interval above the kink.
 43
  
The main findings from these panels are the following. First, excess bunching for all 
panels is highly significant varying from 1 to 5 times the height of the counterfactual 
distributions. Second, the estimated parameter is larger for the newly built apartments in 
both rental and owner-occupant markets, thus supporting the idea that attenuation of 
frictions leads to stronger responses. Third, the difference in magnitude of excess 
bunching in panel A and B also suggests that stronger bunching responses are associated 
with the more elastic supply.  
Examining the heterogeneous bunching responses across different type of properties, 
Figures 1.10 and 1.11 present excess bunching based on property’s age and rent-value.  
Panel A in figure 1.10 includes rental properties that were built at least 5 years before the 
tax regulation. Panel B presents the same graphs for older rental properties by trimming 
the dataset further to only include rental properties that were built at least 15 years before 
the regulation. Figure 1.11 presents excess bunching for high- and low- rent regions. In 
doing so, the full sample is  split into two subsamples, one that include only properties 
located in postal regions with average rent above the median, and the other one that 
includes the rest of observations.  
There is evidence of heterogeneity by property’s age that suggests increasing 
relationship between age and volume of bunching. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that housing deteriorates with age (Brueckner et al 2009). Therefore, older dwellings 
(with probably lower quality) larger than 150𝑚2 can be torn down and replaced with new 
dwellings with size below 150𝑚2 at arguably lower costs. Moreover, Figure 1.11 
illustrates that the bunching for apartments in low-rent neighborhoods is strongly larger 
compared to high rent neighborhoods. This contrast can be interpreted as evidence that 
owners and renters in low-rent neighborhoods might have higher price elasticities. These 
figures may suggest that some of the responses are along other margins such as quality. 
                                                          
43 As a robustness check, I use different orders of polynomials to estimate the counterfactual distributions. The results 
appear to be insensitive to the order of polynomials. 
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In section 1.5.5, I compare the housing characteristics of properties at the two side of the 
cutoff to explore this possibility further.
44
 
To rule out alternative explanations for bunching at the focal point, I formally check 
for the presence of a density discontinuity at the size kink in the owner-occupant market, 
by performing the McCrary test separately for the distributions of the full sample of 
newly built properties, and properties built before the regulation (McCrary 2008). The 
results are consistent with the graphical evidence, suggesting that the log-difference 
between the frequencies of newly built properties just below and above the size kink are 
statistically significant, while the null hypothesis that the discontinuity at the size kink is 
zero cannot be rejected for already built properties.
45
  The contrast between these two 
distributions confirms that the supply of new housing strongly responds to the tax policy. 
This finding also provides evidence of tax spillovers – i.e. the impact of a tax policy in 
one market on others – in the housing market.  
1.5.4. Estimation of Elasticities and Pass Through 
The measures of rent responses, bunching, and costs of filing around the kink point 
(150𝑚2) allow me to calculate the separate estimation of elasticities of housing size 
demand and supply using the structural framework introduced in Section 1.2. Table 1.5 
presents estimated elasticities for different choices of bunching segments. The table is 
organized in five columns. Columns (1) and (2) report the price elasticities of housing 
demand and supply using equation (1.5) and (1.11), respectively. Columns (3) and (4) 
present estimated elasticities, using the measure of bunching from subsample of newly 
built properties, the representative of the frictionless market. Column (5) takes the 
estimated elasticities from column (3) and (4) and embeds them into equation (12) to 
measure the pass-through rate.   
The results for the entire sample show that both elasticities of supply and demand are 
almost always statistically significant with the expected signs for all specifications, 
                                                          
44
 Saez et al (2012) and Kopczuk et al (2015) argue that tax-induced responses along other margins still indicate the 
efficiency costs of taxation. 
45 Point estimates of the McCrary tests for distributions in Figure 8 are as follows: Newly built properties: 0.451 
(0.039); Built before the regulation: 0.074 (0.045). Optimal bin size and bandwidth as in McCrary(2008).  
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consistent with the graphical evidence presented earlier.
46
 The estimated elasticities of 
supply for the subsample of newly built properties, the representative of the frictionless 
market, are 2 to 6 times as large as their counterparts in column (1). This contrast 
highlights the substantial role of frictions in attenuating the housing supply responses. 
The estimates of housing demand elasticities, reported in columns (2) and (4), are 
smaller, but still significant. Results here suggest that the estimation of price elasticity of 
housing size demand highly depends on the magnitude of bunching responses. Column 
(5) presents the estimation of the pass-through rates that range between 0.88 and 0.91 
across different choice of bunching segments, meaning that the incidence ratio is over 
one.
47
  
1.5.5 Robustness Checks 
This section contains additional estimations to ensure that potential biases in the 
sample or alternative explanations do not drive the results. One alternative explanation is 
that some of the local response to the size-kink may be due to supply side and demand 
side adjustment along the quality margin. Although our concentration is on a narrow band 
around the tax cutoff, it is possible that properties below and above the cutoff are 
significantly different along housing characteristics other than size. To investigate this 
possibility, I use records on real estate listings in Tehran for years 2014 to 2016.  
Table 1.6 presents the summary statistics for the 875 listings. Column (1) and (2) 
present the housing characteristics for observations in the size range (140𝑚2, 150𝑚2] 
and (150𝑚2, 160𝑚2], respectively. Each row presents the mean value of housing 
characteristics for both groups. Column (3) presents the results for the mean difference 
between 2 groups. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Column (4) reports the p-value. 
Note that the average rent per square meter for apartments above the cutoff is 4,894 
thousand Rials, which is significantly different from those located below (or equal) the 
                                                          
46 Although estimated elasticities based on the measure of bunching from the entire sample are small, they are 
consistent with the literature on behavioral responses to transaction taxes, which finds relatively small elasticities in 
spite of large housing price responses (e.g. Best and Kleven 2015). 
47 While the results do not seem to be very sensitive to the choice of the bunching segment, increasing the length of the 
bunching segment lead to inclusion of lower and upper band densities around the size kink that are probably affected 
by the tax policy (Saez 2010). Therefore, one would expect to see higher elasticities when the length of bunching 
segments is increased. As a result, the baseline estimations that rely on small bunching segment around the kink are 
lower-bound estimates. 
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cutoff. On the other hand, for mostly all key housing characteristics there is no significant 
difference between the two groups of observations. In fact, the computed Benjamini-
Hochberg p-values only reject the null hypothesis for one characteristic.
48
 Although there 
is no direct way to fully capture the quality of housing, attributes such as facing direction, 
kitchen materials, flooring, building façade, and age plausibly reflect the quality of 
housing. Hence, the results here are reassuring that the base results for the rent responses 
and costs of filing are not significantly biased by the quality adjustment. 
I also run placebo tests to investigate the causality concerns regarding the effect of the 
tax policy on rent. If my results reflect a treatment effect of the tax kink, then the results 
should disappear if I falsely assume that my treatment occurs at 10 square meters before 
or after the actual kink-point. For these tests, I run two additional regressions, one for 
observations within interval (130𝑚2, 150𝑚2) assuming 140𝑚2 is the size kink, and 
another one for observations within the interval (150𝑚2, 170𝑚2) assuming 160𝑚2 is the 
size kink. Results of these regressions, presented in Table A.1 indicate that the 
coefficients estimates on the falsified kink dummies are insignificant. I do two additional 
placebo tests for intervals (120𝑚2, 140𝑚2) and (160𝑚2, 180𝑚2). As in the previous test, 
results again indicate that falsified dummies are not significant. Therefore, the placebo 
tests show my baseline results are robust to subsample choices and the size kink has a 
causal effect on rent values. 
1.6 Conclusions 
This study has taken advantage of rich micro administrative data on rental properties 
in Tehran and quasi-experimental variation in marginal taxes to estimate the price 
elasticities of housing demand and supply simultaneously. Using the estimated 
elasticities, this paper then examined the pass-through rate of the size kink. My analysis 
reveals strong evidence of behavioral responses through bunching below the size kink, 
and a rent spike above it. Using the measure of bunching from newly built properties, for 
which frictions are less and supply is more elastic, the elasticities of housing supply and 
demand are at least 10 times larger compared to estimates using the entire sample. The 
                                                          
48 Although the difference for the number of bedrooms between the two groups is significant, the magnitude is small.   
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high but incomplete estimation of pass-through rates suggest that owners are able to pass 
forward the majority of the tax burden in the form of higher rents.  
This paper shows the importance of considering the supply responses to uncover 
structural elasticities of demand. Additional conclusions are reached on elasticities’ 
estimations because the setting accounts for the effects of incomplete pass through in 
attenuating demand responses. The results from the representation of the “frictionless” 
market highlight the effects of frictions on attenuating behavioral responses. Moreover, 
this may be of broader interest in other fields that generally assume completely elastic 
supply and full pass through. My estimation of incidence ratio above one implies that 
renters who normally are at the bottom tail of the income distribution are the ones who 
bear most of the cost of the policy. That is, size-based taxes on rental properties might be 
highly regressive. Finally, the findings show that rental taxation policy not only distorts 
the owners’ and renters’ decisions in the rental market, but also induces large 
distortionary responses in the owner-occupant market. 
In this paper, I provided a framework to estimate separate price elasticities of housing 
supply and demand using evidence of bunching and incidence. Here, I focus on effects of 
taxation on locations around the kink-point where agents chiefly react through the 
intensive margin. It would be interesting to use this evidence to examine the extensive 
responses to the size kink. I also provided evidence that a size-based tax policy will 
increase the supply of smaller apartments of a size below the cutoff, which can ultimately 
lead to higher urban density. Another interesting research question would be to consider 
the tax-induced variation in urban density to analyze its impacts on labor markets and 
urban characteristics such as innovation rate, local climate, and energy consumptions.  
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1.7  Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1.1: Average Annual Tax 
Notes: This figure shows the average annual tax liabilities per square meter w.r.t. size for the entire sample. The red 
line shows the point where taxation begins. Owners of rental properties with total combined size over 150𝒎𝟐 are 
exposed to the rental income tax. The line itself is in the tax-zero side of the kink. Rent values are deflated to reflect 
year 2015 prices using the Statistical Centre of Iran Housing Price Index. IRR-USD exchange rate was between 15,000 
– 39,000 during the years 2012 - 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
2
5
0
0
5
0
0
0
7
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
2
5
0
0
(0
0
0
 R
ia
ls
)
125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 175
Size (Square Meter)
27 
 
Panel A. Rental Market                                                               
                                          
 
Panel B. Owner-occupant Market 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Observations 
Notes: Panel A. shows the number of rental observations in each district for time period March 2012 – September 
2014. Panel B. shows the number of purchasing observations in each district for the same time period. Colors in panel 
A. and B. illustrate the number of actual renter and owner households in each district, respectively. 
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Figure 1.3: Bunching at the Size Kink  
Notes: This figure illustrates the impact of a size kink on owners’ profits and their decisions on their properties’ size. 
Red curved lines show the production functions. Black solid lines show the Iso-profit curves in the absence of tax. Blue 
dashed lines show the Iso-profit curves in the presence of the size-kink. Owner HA is the marginal bunching individual 
who would choose a property with size 𝑠∗ + ∆𝑠 in the absence of size-threshold. In the presence of the size kink, she is 
indifferent between 𝑠𝐼 and 𝑠∗. Individual LA, who is not affected by the size kink, chooses a property with size 𝑠∗ both 
in the absence and presence of the size kink. 
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Figure 1.4: Renters’ Budget Set Diagram 
Notes: This figure illustrates the impact of a size kink on renters’ budget sets and their properties choices. Dashed 
curved line shows renter’s L indifference curve. Solid curved lines show renter’s H indifference curves.  
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Figure 1.5: Mean Annual Rent around the Kink 
Notes: This figure shows the mean annual real rent/𝒎𝟐 and 90% confidence intervals for rental transactions from 
March 2012 to September 2014. The vertical line shows the point where taxation begins. The line itself is in the tax-
zero side of the kink. The red (green) curved line displays the linear fit for properties with size s ≤ 𝟏𝟓𝟎𝐦𝟐 (𝒔 >
𝟏𝟓𝟎 𝐦𝟐).  The inclined line (orange) displays the linear fit. IRR-USD exchange rate was between 15,000 and 39,000 
during the years 2012 - 2014. 
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Panel A. Entire Sample from 2012 – 2014 
 
Panel B. Newly Built Apartments  
 
Figure 1.6: Apartments Distribution and the Taxation Point 
Notes: This figure displays the histogram of properties’ size (by 5𝑚2 bins). Panel A. includes all observations from 
March 2012 to September 2014 for segment (120𝑚2, 180𝑚2). Plan B. is reduced to include only newly built 
apartments. The dashed line shows the starting point of taxation. The line itself belongs to the tax-zero side of the kink. 
The numbers next to the dashed line are the percentage reduction in the number of apartments that occurs by moving 
from the bin (145m2, 150m2] to the bin (150m2, 155m2]. 
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Panel A. Q2 2012 – Q2 2013 
 
Panel B. Q2 2013 – Q2 2014 
 
Panel C. Q2 2014 – Q3 2014 
 
Figure 1.7: Dynamics of Bunching Behaviors 
Notes: Figure 1.7 illustrates the histogram of apartments’ size for three consecutive years, separately. The solid line 
shows the starting point of taxation. The line itself belongs to the tax-zero side of the kink. The numbers next to the 
dashed line are the percentage reduction in the number of apartments that occurs by moving from the bin 
(145m2, 150m2] to the bin (150m2, 155m2]. 
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Figure 1.8: Apartments Distribution in the Owning Market 
Notes: Figure 1.8 displays the density of newly built and old properties for the owner-occupant market by 5𝑚2 bins. 
The sample of newly built apartments is reduced to include only observations from 2014. The dashed line displays the 
polynomial fit of degree of five for newly built apartments. The solid line shows the starting point of taxation. The line 
itself is on the tax-zero side of the kink.  
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Panel A. Rental Units – Entire Sample                          
  
Panel B. Rental Units – Newly Built Apartments 
  
Panel C. Owner-Occupied Units – Newly Built Apartments 
 
Figure 1.9: Empirical and Counterfactual Distributions around the Size kink 
Notes: This figure illustrates the empirical and counterfactual distributions of apartments in Tehran for years 2012 to 
2014. The counterfactual distribution is estimated for each panel separately based on equation (1.16), by fitting a fifth-
order polynomial to the empirical distribution and excluding the bunching segment. The solid line shows the starting 
point of taxation. The line itself is on the tax-zero side of the kink. The excess bunching 𝐵 is the difference between the 
empirical and counterfactual densities in the small interval below the size kink in proportion to the average 
counterfactual distribution right above the cutoff. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Panel A. Apartments built at least 5 years before the regulation 
 
Panel B. Apartments built at least 15 years before the regulation 
 
Figure 1.10: Apartment Distributions by Property Age 
Notes: This figure illustrates the empirical and counterfactual distributions of apartments in Tehran for years 2012 – 
2014. Panel A includes rental apartments that were built at least 5 years before the tax regulation. Panel B presents the 
same graphs for older rental apartments by trimming the dataset further to only include apartments that were built at 
least 15 years before the regulation. The counterfactual distribution is estimated for each panel separately based on 
equation (1.16) by fitting a fifth-order polynomial to the empirical distribution and excluding the bunching segment. 
The solid line shows the starting point of taxation. The line itself is on the tax-zero side of the kink. The excess 
bunching B is the difference between the empirical and counterfactual densities in the small interval below the size kink 
in proportion to the average counterfactual distribution right above the cutoff. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Panel A. High-rent Neighborhoods                          
 
Panel B. Low-rent Neighborhoods                          
 
Figure 1.11: Apartment Distributions across Different Neighborhoods 
Notes: This figure illustrates the empirical and counterfactual distributions of apartments in Tehran for years 2012 to 
2014. Panel A includes only properties that are located in postal regions with average rent above the median, and Panel 
B includes the rest of observations. The counterfactual distribution is estimated for each panel separately based on 
equation (1.16) by fitting a fifth-order polynomial to the empirical distribution and excluding the bunching segment. 
The solid line shows the starting point of taxation. The line itself is on the tax-zero side of the kink. The excess 
bunching B is the difference between the empirical and counterfactual densities in the small interval below the size kink 
in proportion to the average counterfactual distribution right above the cutoff. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. 
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Table 1.1: Rental Income Tax Schedule 
 
 Notes: Taxable rental income is shown in thousands of Rials, with the IRR-USD exchange rate varying from 15,000 to 
39,000 during these years. For owners of rental properties with combined total size over 150𝒎𝟐, each bracket cutoff is 
associated with a jump in the marginal tax rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bracket (000 Rials) Marginal Tax Rate
0 - 30,000 15%
30,000 - 100,000 20%
100,000 - 250,000 25%
250,000 - 1,000,000 30%
Over 1,000,000 35%
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for Rental Transactions 
 
Notes: This Table presents the summary statistics for sample of residential apartments that were rent during the March 
2012 to September 2014. Rent values are deflated to reflect year 2015 prices using the Statistical Centre of Iran 
Housing Price Index. Data is obtained from Rahbar Informatics Service Corporate (RISC). IRR-USD exchange rate 
was between 15,000 – 39,000 during these years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
Observations
Mean Annual     
    Rent/           
  (000 Rials)
Mean 
Age 
(Year)
Mean Size (     )
Entire Sample 243,144 3,046 11 79.4
(2.69) (0.02) (0.07)
In the range (140     , 150      ] 3,951 3,635 14.4 146.0
(25.9) (0.20) (0.05)
In the range (150     , 160      ) 1,813 3,853 13.7 154.9
(38.09) (0.27) (0.06)
𝑚2 𝑚2
𝑚2 𝑚2
𝑚2𝑚2
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Table 1.3: Existing Stock of Housing   
 
Notes: This table presents the breakdowns of the number of apartments by year and time of construction. Sharper 
shrink in the number of apartments above the kink-point is associated with a reduced share of existing stock of housing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
#Apts built 
before 2004
#Apts built 
after 2004
Share of existing stock 
(before / (before + after))
Difference (%) in       
#Apts between bin  
150      and 155
Q2 2012 - Q2 2013 52,322       25,940       66.9% 49.3%
Q2 2013 - Q2 2014 49,958       49,444       50.3% 51.9%
Q2 2014 - Q3 2014 30,585       34,895       46.7% 56.1%
Total 132,865     110,279     54.6% 52.2%
𝑚2𝑚2
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Table 1.4: The Effects of Taxation on Rent 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is log of total annual real rent per-square-meter. Regressions are based on equation 
(1.16) using the entire sample (March 2012 to September 2014). SizeKink is a dummy variable equal to one for 
properties larger than 150𝒎𝟐. Column 3 includes the interaction of size and size-threshold. All specifications include 5-
digit ZIP Code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. Standard errors in all columns are clustered by 5-digit ZIP Code and 
stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent level, *** = 1 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Size > 150 238.62*** 143.66*** 293.37*** 153.43*** 140.09* 125.38
(26.04) (29.84) (29.25) (35.58) (81.62) (86.23)
(Size > 150      ) × (Size - 150      ) 3.78*** 4.30*** 5.71
(0.57) (0.63) (17.07)
(Size - 150      ) -3.90*** -4.36*** -4.19*** -4.69*** -17.74** -19.20**
(0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (7.21) (8.74)
Observations 243,144 243,144 237,380 237,380 5,764 5,764
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.54
Excluding (140      - 160       )
Rent/Rent/
Entire Sample
Rent/
 (140      - 160      )𝑚2 𝑚2 𝑚2
𝑚2 𝑚2
𝑚2
𝑚2
𝑚2 𝑚2
𝑚2
𝑚2
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Table 1.5:  Housing Elasticities Estimates 
 
Notes: This table presents estimates of elasticities of housing demand and supply using measure of bunching from the 
entire sample in columns (1) and (2). Columns (3) and (4) present the same estimates using measure of bunching from 
the market of newly built properties. Column (5) presents the pass-through rates based on column (3) and (4). Each row 
shows the results for a different choice of bunching segment. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
VARIABLES
Elasticity of 
Housing 
Demand
Elasticity of 
Housing 
Supply
Elasticity of 
Housing 
Demand 
Elasticity of 
Housing 
Supply 
Pass Through Rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bunching Segment (145     -  155     ) -0.015 0.243 -0.172 1.368 0.884
(0.002) (0.041) (0.052) (0.555) (0.001)
Bunching Segment (145     -  160     ) -0.017 0.291 -0.211 1.794 0.889
(0.002) (0.051) (0.068) (0.769) (0.017)
Bunching Segment (140     -  155     ) -0.024 0.544 -0.302 2.913 0.902
(0.003) (0.122) (0.098) (1.301) (0.001)
Bunching Segment (140     -  160     ) -0.025 0.616 -0.365 3.765 0.0907
(0.003) (0.174) (0.113) (1.579) (0.001)
Measure of bunching from 
the entire sample
Measure of bunching from the "frictionless" market 
(Newly-built apartments) 
𝑚2 𝑚2
𝑚2 𝑚2
𝑚2
𝑚2 𝑚2
𝑚2
 = 1
1+
𝜀𝑑
𝜀𝑠
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Table 1.6:  Summary of Housing Characteristics 
 
Note: Rent is the total rent per square meter. View is a dummy variable equal to one if the unit faces more than one 
direction. Kitchen Materials, Flooring, Building Façade Materials, Parking, storage, balcony, yard, elevator are dummy 
variables that get one if the unit has them and zero otherwise. Pool, Sauna, and Jacuzzi is a dummy variable that gets 
value of one if the unit has a pool, sauna, or Jacuzzi. t-statistics in parentheses.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables (140      ,150      ] (150       ,160      ] Mean difference P-Value
# of stories in the building 4.79 5.14 0.35 0.145
(1.46)
# of units in each floor 2.11 1.96 -0.15 0.260
(-1.13)
View 0.228 0.253 0.025 0.391
(0.86)
Floor number 2.71 2.79 0.086 0.639
(0.47)
# of Bedrooms 2.81 2.90 0.092 0.001
(3.47)
Age 12.17 12.25 0.054 0.932
(0.09)
         Metal, Half-wooden, High Gloss 0.11 0.08 -0.037 0.082
(-1.74)
         MDF 0.80 0.85 0.047 0.078
(1.76)
       High-end 0.081 -0.071 -0.01 0.583
(-0.55)
         Carpet 0.40 0.36 -0.035 0.305
(-1.03)
         Ceramic 0.025 0.036 0.011 0.322
(0.99)
       Laminate, Mixed
0.099 0.105 0.005 0.791
       Parquet (0.27)
       High-end stone 0.422 0.451 0.029 0.389
(0.86)
       Stone 0.77 0.76 -0.014 0.627
(-0.49)
       Roman design 0.038 0.046 0.008 0.547
(0.60)
       Bricks 0.076 0.092 0.017 0.384
(0.87)
       Cement 0.036 0.029 -0.005 0.68
(-0.41)
       Granite 0.031 0.034 0.003 0.792
(0.26)
       Kenitex 0.025 0.019 -0.006 0.517
(-0.65)
      Travertine - Composite 0.014 0.012 -0.002 0.796
(-0.26)
Parking 0.88 0.88 0.006 0.787
(0.27)
Storage 0.87 0.90 0.032 0.156
(1.42)
Balcony 0.54 0.51 -0.033 0.355
(-.092)
Pool, Sauna, or Jacuzzi 0.1 0.14 0.032 0.141
(1.47)
Yard 0.235 0.277 0.043 0.156
(1.42)
Elevator 0.547 0.61 0.068 0.047
(1.99)
# of Observations 552 323
Flooring  (1 to 7)
Kitchen Materials
Building Façade Materials
𝑚2 𝑚2 𝑚2𝑚2
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CHAPTER 2: AIR POLLUTION, HOUSING PRICES, AND COSTS 
OF SANCTIONS: A NATURAL EXPERIMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
The association between air quality and housing values has been the subject of 
economic studies since 1960’s. Cross-sectional studies using hedonic price models 
suggest a negative relationship between air pollution indices and housing prices. 
However, the estimated cross-sectional hedonic models suffer from a number of 
econometric problems such as omitted variable bias. Because of such issues, economists 
question both the validity of the causal inference and the accuracy of estimates of 
marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for air quality in traditional hedonic estimations. To 
address these problems, some studies (e.g. Chay et al 2005; Grainger 2013) suggested 
Instrumental Variable models using policy regulations as instrumental variables for 
changes in the level of air pollution.  
Chay and Greenstone (2005) results shows that the elasticity of housing values with 
respect to the level of TSP is larger than what cross sectional studies found and ranges 
from -0.2 to -0.35. These estimations are based on variations in pollution and housing 
prices over the course of 10 years from 1970 to 1980. Other studies also utilized IV 
methods to investigate the long-run association of air pollution and housing values 
between different regions/counties within a country (e.g. Bayer et al 2009). However, in 
the long run time horizon, the assumption that the housing supply is inelastic can be 
problematic. Besides, households and businesses may find enough time to move to 
regions/counties that have better air quality. All these can lead to biased estimates of 
individuals’ MWTP for the clear air. Finding a policy that induces a fast and 
heterogeneous increase in the level of air pollutants within a city can provide a 
framework that addresses these issues.   
In this paper, we examine the casual impact of air pollution by exploiting the 
heterogeneous jump in the level Nitrogen Dioxide within Tehran, induced by 
unprecedented nuclear sanctions that targeted Iran’s import of gasoline. We implement 
our methodology utilizing this unique natural experiment combined with a rich dataset 
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that includes around one million actual housing transactions both in the owner-occupied 
market and the rental market over the course of five years. This extensive data set 
provides the opportunity to compare agents’ responses across the two markets in short 
run where supply is plausibly inelastic. We then examine the impact of air pollution on 
individuals’ expectations of the future housing prices and whether there is any evidence 
of substitution from owner-occupied market to rental market in highly polluted 
neighborhoods.  
To the best of our knowledge, this study will be the first study that explores the 
indirect environmental impact of Iranian Nuclear Sanctions. Following the unprecedented 
Iranian nuclear sanctions and subsequent preemptive actions by the Iranian government, 
the level of air pollution rapidly increased starting from late 2010 due to the supply of 
low quality domestically produced gasoline. The heterogeneous nature of this pollution 
jump within Tehran, which is an important factor in our identification strategy, mostly 
comes from the wind pattern, urban structure, and the difference in neighborhoods’ 
elevation. Our study addresses the causality issue, exploiting heterogeneous severe 
increases in the level of pollution in Tehran in the aftermath of sanctions. Since the 
effects of sanctions were unanticipated, we have no reason to expect households sort 
based on their preferences for the pollution before the spike. One distinctive feature of 
this incidence of pollution jump is that it is mainly because of the increase in the level of 
𝑁𝑂2 as a prominent combustion-induced air pollutant (as opposed to other papers that 
mainly focus on pollutants that are mostly induced by industrial activities).  
Our research design is based on sharp variation in the pollution indices across 1,700 
neighborhoods and comparing housing values within these neighborhoods over time. We 
employ daily readings of 39 monitors in Tehran to construct daily distance-weighted 
pollution indices for each neighborhood. For each transaction, we provide pollution 
indices that reflect the average level of the air pollution in one week, one month, and 
three months before the transaction date in the respective neighborhood. Our model 
captures the effects of pollution on housing prices, rents, and price-rent ratio, after 
adjustment for housing characteristics, time effects, and time-invariant neighborhoods 
effects. 
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Our findings demonstrate that 30 parts-per-billion (ppb) increase of outdoor 
concentration of Nitrogen Dioxide leads to 3.5 to 5.2 percent decrease in housing prices. 
Compared to Chay and Greenstone (2005), these estimates signify a lower elasticity of 
housing values with respect to the level of air pollution. Although these results are closer 
to the findings of most cross-sectional studies, one might consider that this paper’s 
estimates are mainly derived by the housing market responses in a short-time horizon. 
We find similar adverse effects in the rental market, albeit the estimates are smaller in 
magnitude. Our welfare analysis indicates a $11 to $16 billion reduction in housing 
values in 2011 induced by the significant increase in the level of pollution due to gasoline 
sanctions. Moreover, an increase in the level of air pollution is associated with a decrease 
in the average price-rent ratio at the neighborhood level. This result suggests that 
expectations for future prices make agents in the purchasing market more sensitive to the 
deterioration of the level of air quality when compared to the rental market outcomes. 
Our results also reveal that if we restrict purchasing and rental observations to a 
shorter time-period where supply is more inelastic, the coefficients of interest will be 
larger. Also, we examine how housing qualities will interact with the impact of the 
pollution on housing prices. We find evidence on heterogeneity by size, suggesting that 
the larger the housing unit becomes, the weaker the impact of the air pollution on housing 
value will be, with the stronger impact in the rental market. Moreover, to mitigate the 
impact of sellers’ (who have currently occupied the housing unit) distaste for the 
pollution, we run same baseline regressions on newly built housing units where we still 
find significant and negative coefficients for the pollutions’ impact. Merging rental and 
purchasing data, we find that there is a substitution from the owners-occupant market to 
the rental market. Based on our estimates, the number of properties that are first sold, and 
then offered for lease is significantly higher in more polluted neighborhoods. This pattern 
is consistent with our base results on the negative association between pollution indices 
and price-rent ratios. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews related literature 
and the history of sanction. Section 2.3 discusses the data. Section 2.4 presents the 
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empirical model, and section 2.5 outlines results and discussion followed by robustness 
checks. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Literature Review and Background 
2.2.1 Literature Review 
Ridker and Henning (1967) is one of the first cross-sectional studies in this literature. 
Their analysis of 167 neighborhoods in St. Louis shows that Sulfation Level index of the 
air (SO2, SO3, H2S and H2SO4) explains 1.2 percent of the variation of the median 
property value in that neighborhood. Many other cross-sectional papers based on hedonic 
price models showed that a decrease in TSP results in an increase in property value. 
Smith and Huang (1995) provide a meta-analysis of many of those cross-sectional 
studies. A growing body of literature also uses the housing market to measure values of 
non-market amenities (e.g. Davis 2004). 
Chay and Greenstone (2005) addressed the cross-sectional studies problems namely 
the causality issue and the heterogeneous taste for clean air by exploiting 1970 Clean Air 
Act Amendments (CAAA) as an instrumental variable. Grainger (2013) used similar 
instrumental variable method to compare the impact of the variation in the level of PM10 
on rental versus owner-occupied housing values. He found that only half of the increases 
in the housing value, caused by improvement in the quality of air, are reflected in the 
form of higher rents. Both studies are based on variations in pollution and housing prices 
at the county level over the course of 10 years. A growing body of literature also 
investigates the local impacts of industrial activities with hazardous impacts or toxic 
pollutants on the housing market (e.g. Davis 2011; Greenstone and Gallagher 2008; 
Currie, Davis, Greenstone and Walker 2015). Davis (2011) also found that power plants 
have smaller impacts on local rents than housing values. 
A separate but related literature analyzes the relationship between prices and rents in 
the housing market. Capozza and Seguin (1996) examined how price-rent ratio has 
predictive power for expected change in future housing prices. Gyourko et al (2013) 
discussed the correlation between price-rent ratio and future expected prices. They show 
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that a higher price-rent ratio implies that homeowners are willing to accept lower current 
yield in the form rent to obtain higher expected capital gain in the future.  
There is also a body of the literature on the direct impact of sanctions on economic 
activities of the targeted country. Some articles (mostly not peer review or in the 
literature of economics)  discussed the economic impacts of recent Iranian Nuclear 
Sanctions. However, to our knowledge, this is the first paper that measures the indirect 
impact of the mentioned sanctions, especially their environmental impact. 
2.2.2 History of Sanctions 
Following the development of nuclear program in Iran, a series of international 
sanctions were imposed on the country’s nuclear enrichment program. In 2006, as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported Iran’s suspicious activities and 
non-compliance with its agreements, the first United Nations Security Council Resolution 
passed in July the same year. The resolution demanded that Iran suspends all of its 
enrichment related activities. As the dispute continued, a number of other resolutions 
were passed by the Security Council that mainly targeted Iranian economic activities.
1
 
The sanctions were not restricted to the Security Council Resolutions. The United States 
and the European Union imposed several other sanctions against Iran. Consequently, 
Iran’s oil industry, banking sectors, and international trade activities faced the toughest 
sanctions in the history of the country.  
In July 2010, The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
Act was passed by U.S. Congress in order to extend the sanctions against Iran. It mainly 
targeted Iran’s import of gasoline.2 Although Iran was a major producer of oil, the 
country imported almost 40 percent of its gasoline and 11 percent of its diesel fuel at the 
time. In that year, as a preemptive action, Iran began rapidly increasing its fuel 
                                                          
1 Texts of UN resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, 1984, 2049 are available. After Iran Deal in July 2015 
resolution of 2231 has been passed. It aimed to gradually lift UN sanctions against Iran.   
2 Text of the act is available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/hr2194.pdf. 
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production capacity by converting petrochemical plants to gasoline production refineries 
in a two-year plan.
3
  
2.2.2.1 Sub-Standard Gasoline and Air Pollution 
The plan to replace imported gasoline with domestic refineries’ produced gasoline 
resulted in a dramatic shock to the level of air pollution in large cities of Iran, especially 
the capital city of Tehran, starting from December 2010.
4
 The air quality index of 𝑁𝑂2 
increased almost 100 percent compared to its previous annual average. Since then, many 
experts and even government officials blamed the use of low quality gasoline produced 
by domestic petrochemical refineries as the main cause of air pollution. Later the Iranian 
oil minister admitted that the main source of the smog is sub-standard gasoline (The 
Guardian, 2014).  
The main reasons that were mentioned as the link between sub-standard gasoline and 
air pollution are the low octane number, the higher level of Benzene, and the incomplete 
combustion. It is known that internal combustion engines are one of the main sources of 
many major pollutant factors like CO, 𝑁𝑂2, and 𝑂3. According to Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the most prominent source of Nitrogen Dioxide is emissions 
from cars and other road vehicles.  
Daily data on pollution indices obtained from Tehran Air Quality monitors show the 
rapid increase in levels of both 𝑁𝑂2 and 𝑂3. This favors the argument of those who 
blame the excessive presence of hydrocarbons like Benzene and imperfect combustion of 
refineries-produced gasoline as the main reason of post 2010 air pollution. 
In this research, we use the rapid increase of the level of Nitrogen Dioxide as an 
index for air pollution. Nitrogen Dioxide is considered by many international standards as 
a major air pollution indicator. For instance, the U.S. EPA’s National Ambient Air 
Quality Standard uses 𝑁𝑂2 as an indicator for a group of Nitrogen Oxides (𝑁𝑂𝑥). It is 
                                                          
3 Masoud Mirkazemi Minister of Petroleum at the time announced that the Iran’s gasoline production increase action 
plan will secure the country against eminent sanctions on fuel import and will turn the nation from an importer to an 
exporter of gasoline. 
4 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/09/iran-tehran-pollution-petrol-sanctions. 
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classified as one of the six common pollutants along with ground-level Ozone, Particulate 
Matter (e.g. PM2.5 and PM10), Carbon Monoxide, Lead, and Sulphur Dioxide.  
2.2.2.2 Nitrogen Dioxide Health Effects 
According to the U.S. EPA, high levels of 𝑁𝑂2 have major negative health effects. A 
short term exposure of more than half an hour brings adverse respiratory effects on 
children and healthy adults (Chay and Greenstone 2003). Also, it will deteriorate 
symptoms of those who have respiratory diseases such as Asthma. Increased visits to 
emergency and hospitals for respiratory issues are connected with increase in the level of 
this highly reactive gas (Shima and Motarki 2000). Nitrogen oxides also react with 
ammonia, moisture, and other compounds to form particles that can penetrate into 
sensitive lung tissues and cause emphysema, bronchitis and premature death.
5
 Nitrogen 
Oxides are also blamed for photochemical processes that lead to the formation of Nitric 
Acid (Cleveland 1979). Such Acid causes adverse effects on the ecosystem.  
The ground-level Ozone that is created by 𝑁𝑂𝑥 can also cause shortness of breath, as 
well as throat and eye irritation. According to some experts, Ozone can be a serious 
problem for the environment. Plant scientists blame it for 90 percent of the damage to the 
vegetation in North America. As it can travel long distances, the urban-produced ground-
level Ozone can extend its negative effects onto rural and agricultural areas by reduction 
in crop yields.
6
 
Nitrogen Dioxide is a visible gas by absorbing short-wave length blue light. It has a 
reddish-brown color when warm and is yellowish brown at cold temperatures (Shima and 
Motarki 2000). Nitrogen Oxides together with Ozone and other photochemical oxidants 
are key components responsible for the creation of smog. Therefore, not only will a rise 
in the level of pollutants like 𝑁𝑂2 and 𝑂3 bring negative health effects that are easily 
identifiable, but it also creates visible smog that makes it easy for individuals to have a 
negative evaluation of the air quality in the neighborhood. This fact will support the 
notion that Nitrogen Dioxide is a proper index both for the relevant level of pollution and 
for individual perception of the air quality.  
                                                          
5 https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/nitrogenoxides/index.html 
6 Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook, WORLD BANK GROUP, 1998, pp 223-225.  
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2.3 Data 
The housing data are obtained from the Rahbar Informatics Services Company 
(RISC). The air quality data described below come from Tehran Air Quality Control 
Agency (TAQCA), which provides detailed data on concentrations of 6 major pollutants 
including nitrogen dioxide over time for a network of monitors. Data on Universal 
Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinates of Tehran’s neighborhoods and air quality 
control (AQC) monitors are provided by Iran Post Company. This section describes the 
data used in this study. 
2.3.1 Housing data 
Starting from 2009, Iranian law requires all housing transactions including purchasing 
and rental to be registered online.
7
 Typically, an owner sells or leases her property 
through real estate agencies. If the seller (owner) and buyer (renter) reach an agreement, 
the real estate agent will complete specific forms online and record needed information. 
The information recorded in the system includes personal information of the seller 
(owner) and the buyer (renter), price or rent, full address of the unit, size, age, zip-code, 
and date of contract. In the address, the floor number of the unit is also available. 
The raw data include 348,645 real and 735,436 purchase observations during the 
years 2009 – 2014, properly covering the 22 different districts of Tehran. In the final 
data, we remove transactions for which complete information is not available. All 
nonresidential transactions are also excluded.
8
 We also exclude observations where the 
district number does not match with the zip-code, possibly due to data-entering mistakes. 
Moreover, to rule out the effects of outliers, the rent and price per square meter are 
trimmed at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. The final sample includes 296,613 rental 
and 690,226 purchase observations from 2009 to 2014. 
Table 2.1 illustrates the distribution of data across districts. As shown in the Table, 
each of the 22 districts contains several thousand rental and purchase observations, 
indicating that the data are representative of all neighborhoods. Table 2.2 presents 
                                                          
7 http://www.iranamlaak.ir/Files/TasvibNameh.aspx 
8 An apartment in this study is defined as a unit that is owned individually, which is very similar to the definition of a 
condo in the US housing market.  
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summary statistics for both rental and purchasing data. Data cover around 1,700 
neighborhoods (i.e. 5-digit zip-codes). Total number of neighborhoods in Tehran is 
around 2,700 that include non-residential areas such as parks, university campuses, 
airports, and military zones. We drop zip codes that contain less than 10 residential 
transactions within 5 years of the data.  
Later, to create a measure of price-rent ratio at the 5-digit zip-code level, we calculate 
daily average rent and price per square meter for each 5-digit zip-code in both rent and 
purchasing data, respectively, and merge the two data on the basis of 5-digit zip-code, 
year, month, and day. Keeping high quality matches using this method the matched data 
include 79,292 unique 5-digit zip-code-day level observations.  
2.3.2 Air Quality Data 
The air quality data used in this study are provided by TAQCA, which collects hourly 
observations on concentration of six major pollutant CO, 𝑆𝑂2, 𝑂3, 𝑃𝑀2.5, 𝑃𝑀10, and 
𝑁𝑂2 using 39 monitors across Tehran. Figure 2.1 shows that the locations of monitors are 
well spread throughout the city. We employ UTM coordinates for each 5-digit zip-code 
and 39 air quality monitors to calculate the pollution level for each neighborhood. Note 
that, In Iran, 10-digit zip-codes locate an address precisely. A 5-digit zip-code typically 
contains several blocks so that it can properly determine the neighborhood boundaries.
9
 
In order to construct the pollution indices, for each 5-digit zip-code, we pick the daily 
readings of three closest monitors and calculate the inverse distance weighted-average of 
them.
10
 
11
 Then we calculate the average of those daily indices for one week, one month, 
and three months before the time of each transaction. The logarithms of those averages 
are used as the value of pollution index variable in the model.  
 
 
                                                          
9 A block is defined as the smallest area surrounded by four streets. 
10 The distance-weighted average for each day includes monitors that were active on that day, as some monitors may be 
added, repaired, or removed the timeframe. 
11 We also construct another Pollution Index using the daily inverse distance-weighted average of all 39 monitors. The 
results are similar using either version of the Pollution Index. 
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2.4 Model 
Figure 2.2 shows the average level of Nitrogen Dioxide in ppb in Tehran since 2006. 
This figure demonstrates that before Autumn of 2010, the average level of Nitrogen 
Dioxide density in the air of Tehran was around 30 ppb. A few months after the 
announcement of the start of new gasoline production policy, Tehran’s air quality 
monitors show that the level of 𝑁𝑂2 increased almost to 90 ppb and then stabilized 
around 60 ppb. That is an increase of almost 100 percent in the level of 𝑁𝑂2 Index 
compared to before 2010. 
The mentioned policy shock, caused by sanctions, provides a quasi-natural 
experiment to study the effect of air pollution on the housing market. First, the impact of 
this increase in the level of pollution seems to be independent of other factors that may 
have impact on the housing market. As shown in Figure 2.2, the level of air pollution 
before the policy is almost stable, and a few months afterwards we observe an evident 
jump. Therefore, the air quality index of 𝑁𝑂2 does not seem to follow any specific trend 
or cycle related to macroeconomic factors. Due to sustainability of the increase in 
pollution along with implementation of new sets of economic sanctions in 2011 and 
2012, it is reasonable to assume that individuals consider this increase as a permanent 
change. Second, we observe a heterogeneous increase in the level of pollution in different 
neighborhoods. As it was mentioned, our data are from 39 different monitors in different 
areas of Tehran. Not all neighborhoods and monitors experienced similar increase in the 
level of pollution. Hence, the expectation is that the exogenous and heterogeneous 
increase in the level of pollution has affected transaction values differently across 
neighborhoods. Figure 2.3 shows trends of 𝑁𝑂2 index recorded from two separate 
monitors with roughly the same latitude.  
Figure 2.4 demonstrates the heterogeneity of pollution index across zip codes. This 
figure graphs the weekly pollution index for two days, one year before and after the time 
of the pollution spike, December 2010. The figure only includes zip codes that cover 
sales on both days. As figure 4 illustrates, the pollution index graph for one year before 
the shock is fairly flat across zip codes with average of 25 ppb. One year after the peak 
the heterogeneity of pollution index by zip code is evident with some zip code still meet 
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the EPA standards for 𝑁𝑂2 concentration, while for some others the pollution level is 
more than twice as the standard level. Figure A1 also presents the monthly average of 
pollution index across zip codes one year before and after the pollution spike peak, 
December 2010. 
In neighborhoods that experience less increase in the level of pollution, the better air 
quality will be reflected in housing values in the form of higher real price or rent. In fact, 
in the short run where supply is reasonably inelastic, price adjustment fully captures the 
demand responses. Marginal willingness to pay for clean air is not necessarily equivalent 
in the rental market and purchasing market. In the purchasing market, individuals may 
consider the environmental amenities more than they do in the rental market. One 
explanation is buyers take into account the long run exposure to pollution. For instance, 
families may have concerns about the negative long run impact of such low air quality on 
their children’s health.  
To formally examine the association between air pollution and housing prices, we fit 
the following regression model: 
 (𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑧𝑡 =
 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑧𝑡+𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑧𝑡+𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑧𝑡+𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑧𝑡
2 +𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑧𝑡
2 +
𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝑍𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀  
(2.1) 
where 𝑖 is the index of transaction, 𝑧 represents the 5-digit zip-code, and 𝑡 indicates the 
date of transaction. Equation (2.1) controls for seasonal and year fixed effects to account 
for seasonal patterns and macroeconomic variations that impact the overall housing 
market. It also includes 5-digit zip-code fixed effects to captures all time-invariant 
determinants of housing prices in a neighborhood. We also report richer specifications 
that include district trends to allow for different over-time adjustment of housing prices in 
each district. There is a separate municipality in each district, which means public 
investment on infrastructures and local amenities can follow different trend across 
districts. 
To consider the impact of outliers, we utilized logged value of housing prices, rents 
and pollution indices in our model. We tried other specifications including linear and log-
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linear model and we got economically and statistically significant results too. However, 
residuals distribution of the log-log specification look more normal compared to log-
linear and linear model. In addition, log-log specification lead to a higher value of R-
squared compared to log-linear specification. We also applied Box-Cox lambda 
transformation to our basic sets of regressions and get small lambda between 0.17-0.25. 
The null hypothesis of lambda is rejected for all economically sensible transformations of 
lambda equal to 0, 1 and -1. However, it does not make economic sense to insist on 
maximizing the log-likelihood score and use the best fitting transformation parameter of 
0.17. Qualitatively, the number is closer to zero. Therefore, it seems convincing to use 
log-log transformation while we also get significant results if we use other forms of 
specification.   
This model follows a difference-in-difference strategy that relies on a comparison of 
housing transaction prices in less polluted and more polluted neighborhoods. The 
constructed time-variant pollution index variable captures the heterogeneous variation of 
pollution across neighborhoods. Therefore, our coefficient of interest in equation (2.1) 
is 𝛽1. It reflects the impact of different level of pollution across neighborhoods on 
housing transactions prices. As both the dependent and the explanatory variable are in 
logarithm form, the 𝛽1 yields the price elasticity of the air pollution. 
We also run the same regression in the rental market to compare the difference of the 
impact in this market versus the purchasing market. In doing so, we use the logarithm of 
annual real rent per square meter for each transaction as the dependent variable. 
Moreover, we construct a panel data by merging the rental and purchasing data and run 
panel regressions with the log of neighborhoods’ averages of price-rent ratio as the 
dependent variable. 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Baseline Results 
Table 2.3 presents the baseline results from 8 regressions using equation (2.1). The 
dependent variable is natural logarithm of real price per-square meter and the parameter 
of interest is the log of pollution index. These regressions are divided into 4 groups where 
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we use different time periods before the transaction to calculate distance-weighted 
pollution index for each group. All regressions control for age, size, and floor of the 
housing unit, along with zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects.  The even-numbered 
columns also include district trends. The result of the baseline regression for the 
purchasing market is based on approximately 650,000 transactions over more than 5 
years. Standard errors are adjusted for 1710 clusters based on the notion of 5-digit zip-
code. For all regressions in this section, the sample excludes observations within two 
months before and after the pollution spike (Dec 2010) to better capture the heterogeneity 
across zip codes. Results including those four months are available in Appendix Table B1 
to B3. 
As reported in Table 2.3, all coefficients of pollution indices are highly significant 
and negative. These results demonstrate the elasticity of (negative) 0.035 to 0.052 for 
house prices with respect to the 𝑁𝑂2 pollutant factor. In other words, 30 units increase in 
𝑁𝑂2 pollutant index (almost equal to the average increase in Tehran) will result in 3 to 6 
percent decrease in housing values. From Table 3, we observe an increase in the impact 
as the time duration of pollution index changes from one week in column (1) to 3 months 
in column (3). The 95 percent confidence intervals for column (1) and (2) do not overlap 
with the 95 percent confidence interval in column (3). This pattern suggests that agents 
will demonstrate a higher level of distaste for air pollution if the air quality deterioration 
is more persistent in a given neighborhood prior to the time of transaction. 
Table 2.4 presents results of regressions based on equation (2.1), using the log of real 
rental prices as the dependent variable. The coefficients’ are smaller in magnitude 
compared to the results for the purchasing market in Table 2.3. One explanation for these 
different impacts between the purchasing market and the rental market might be due to 
long-term concerns in buying versus renting a property. In other words, buyers 
demonstrate larger willingness to pay for the clean air compared to tenants as they 
probably plan to stay longer in that property. Moreover, one might consider that buying a 
property is a form of investment. Hence, the expectation of future prices might play an 
important role in purchasing decision making. Next, we explore this possibility.   
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In Table 2.5, we construct a panel data using daily average prices and rents in both 
the purchasing and the rental market for each 5-digit zip-code. The dependent variable is 
the ratio of daily 5-digit zip-code average price to rent. Similar to previous analyses, the 
variable of interest is the pollution index here. Following the baseline regression, we 
control for average age, size, and other features for each zip code. The panel regression 
also controls for both time and 5-digit zip-code fixed effects.  
The estimates from Table 2.5 show that 1 percent increase in the level of air pollution 
is associated with a 0.019 to 0.028 percent decrease in the price-rent ratio. Controlling for 
localized trends, presented in even-numbered columns, does not change the results. Our 
estimates suggest that in more polluted neighborhoods, individuals might expect lower 
increase in the housing prices over the long run compared to relatively cleaner 
neighborhoods. This is consistent with the findings of Capozza and Seguin (1996) and 
Gyourko et al (2013) that show higher price-rent ratio in the housing market is associated 
with higher expected capital gain.  It is worth noting that this result implies that not only 
pollution affects the current value of housing, but also it negatively affects the 
expectation of future capital gain.  
2.5.2 Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks 
In the short run, housing supply is relatively inelastic, thus, the full welfare effects of 
pollution are exclusively captured by adjustment in prices (rents). On the other hand, over 
the long run, some of the welfare effects can be captured by quantity adjustment as 
supply becomes more elastic. To attenuate the effects of quantity responses, Table 2.6 
and 2.7 presents results from equation 1 that restricts purchasing and rental observations 
to within 20 months of the pollution spike, December 2010.
12
 Our estimates for the 
pollution indices in the short run for both rental and owner-occupied market are larger, 
but consistent with the base results.
13
 Over the shorter period of time with arguably more 
inelastic supply, house price capitalization explains the full welfare effects so that the 
point estimates are larger. 
                                                          
12 Our data start from March 2009, 20 months before December 2010. 
13 The 95 percent confidence interval for 1 week and 1 month pollution index in Table 6 do not overlap those associated 
with the counterpart estimates in Table 3. 
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Taking advantage of observable characteristics of properties in our data, we also 
examine how variation in quality of houses can affect our baseline estimates. The housing 
characteristics we explore are size and age of properties. Table 2.8 presents the results of 
this investigation for the owner-occupied market. Regression models are based on the 
augmented versions of equation 1 that include an additional term for the interaction of the 
pollution indices with each of the above characteristics. We then estimate another 
regression model that includes both interaction terms. The paramter estimates associated 
with Pollution Index×Property Age across different specifications are almost all 
insignificant, indicating that there is no evidence of heterogeneity by property age. On the 
other hand, we find evidence on heterogeneity by property size. Columns (2), (5), and (8) 
that include an interaction of Pollution Index with size, imply that 100 square meter 
increase in the size of a property reduces the effects of pollution on housing prices by 
half. A possible explanation for this result is that larger properties are arguably in better 
quality and have higher level of additions, appliances, and other amenities. These 
amenities mitigate the adverse effects of air pollution. 
Table 2.9 presents respective estimates for the rental market. Similar to estimates in 
Table 2.8, we only find evidence on heterogeneity with respect to size. Point estimates 
for the interaction of size and pollution is larger in the rental market. Under the 
assumption that size is a reasonable proxy for quality of housing, it is possible that at the 
time of transaction quality of housing is more substitutable with air quality for renters as 
opposed to buyers. This is to say, renters behave more like short term consumers of 
housing, while buyers behave more like long-term investors. Moreover, the coefficient 
estimates of Pollution Index in Table 2.9 are significantly smaller than their counterparts 
in Table 2.8, which coincides with our explanation for the baseline results.   
One might expect that in highly polluted neighborhoods sellers with an extreme 
aversion to air pollution are willing to sell their properties at discount value to move out 
sooner. In that case the price response to the pollution may be partially driven by sellers 
distaste for pollution. To alleviate this concern, we rerun the specification 1, focusing 
only on new constructions. The advantage of this approach is that seller of a new 
construction is plausibly indifferent to the level of air pollution in the neighborhood of 
the given property as she probably does not reside there.  
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Table 2.10 reports the pollution index estimates for subsample of new constructions 
in the owner-occupied market. Point estimates are smaller in magnitude compared to 
estimates in Table 2.3, ranging from 0.031 to 0.045. This result suggests that sellers taste 
for air pollution might have weak influence on our estimates of local responses to the air 
pollution. However, the 95 percent confidence intervals of estimates for the sample of 
new constructions overlap those associated with the estimates for the full sample. 
Thus far, all the evidence on the effects of air pollution on housing prices and rents 
use the distance-weighted average for pollution indices. Here we explore an alternative 
estimation that uses non-distance weighted emissions of Nitrogen Dioxide for the 
pollution indices. In particular, we construct a one-mile radius circle around each monitor 
and assign the average of daily readings of Nitrogen Dioxide concentration from a given 
monitor to the housing transactions that lie within the given circle. Note that if a housing 
transaction is close to more than one monitor, the pollution index is the average of 
readings from all close monitors.  
Table 2.11 reports the results for the alternative estimations. The regression models 
are based on equation 1 and include year, seasonal, and 5-digit zip-code fixed effects. 
The estimates indicate that 100 percent increase in the level of outdoor Nitrogen Dioxide 
is associated with a 1.8 to 3.1 percent reduction in housing values. Despite the fact that 
we drop roughly 80 percent of our observations, all estimates are still strongly significant, 
albeit they are smaller in magnitude than the baseline results. Table B.3 presents the 
results for half-mile circles to check for the sensitivity of these results to the choice of 
distance. We find that our results are robust to the choice of distance. Using similar 
specification for the rental market lead to insignificant coefficients as only 12 to 16 
percent of rental observations survive. 
2.5.3 Effects of Pollution on Buyers Decision on Property Usage 
In this section, we present evidence indicating that the pollution may change the 
usage of purchased properties from owner occupied to non-owner occupied. In fact, 
buyers of owner-occupied properties in highly polluted areas can avoid pollution by 
turning them to rental properties. Moreover, based on our findings of negative correlation 
between price-rent ratio and the level of pollution, conditional on property’s price, the 
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current yield (rent) on housing investment is more likely to be higher in more polluted 
neighborhoods. Therefore, the prediction is that the number of properties that are first 
sold, and then offered for lease is significantly higher in more polluted neighborhoods.  
To check for the validity of this prediction, we merge the purchased data with the 
rental data on the basis of 10-digit zip code, floor-level, and district to determine which 
properties appear in both datasets.
14
 Among those, we tag properties that the sales date is 
before the rent date. There are 55,532 properties for which buyers have decided to offer 
them to lease, which we refer to as “bought and rent” properties. We formally investigate 
the impact of air pollution on the probability of the substitution of a property from being 
owner occupied to rental using the following logit regression: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =
 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑧𝑡+𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑧𝑡+𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑧𝑡+𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑧𝑡
2 +𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑧𝑡
2 +
𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝑍𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀  
(2.2) 
where Yit is an indicator equal to one if a property is “bought and rent” and zero 
otherwise, and t is the date of purchasing transaction. The independent variables are the 
same as equation (2.1). Table 2.12 reports the results. As predicted, we find that the 
probability of switching the usage of a property from owner occupied to non-owner 
occupied is significantly higher in more polluted neighborhoods. One hundred percent 
increase in the concentration of outdoor Nitrogen Dioxide is associated with 
approximately 10 percent increase in the odds of renting a purchased property. 
2.5.4 Costs of the Sanction 
All of our analyses show that air pollution has a causal effect on housing prices and 
rents in Tehran. Air pollution deterioration in Tehran and its subsequent consequences 
can be considered as one of the indirect impacts of the sanctions. In this section, we use 
the results from Table 2.3 to analyze the extent to which the cost of the sanctions that is 
associated with the adverse effect of pollution on the housing market. 
                                                          
14 We keep those matched observations that recorded size in purchasing data matches the one in the rental data. 
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The above hedonic approach leads to estimation of average marginal willingness to 
pay (MWTP) for 1-unit increase in the pollution index. However, to measure the welfare 
consequences of sanction-induced non-marginal increase in air pollution, we need to 
identify the MWTP function (Chay and Greenstone, 2005). Therefore, we calculate the 
willingness to pay (WTP) for pollution under the assumption of linear and homogeneous 
preferences, which means constant MWTP. 
The National Population and Housing Census (NPHC) data from Iran Statistics 
Center show that in 2011 about 2.6 million residential units were in Tehran, with a total 
accumulative size of approximately 228 million square meters. As mentioned before, 
Tehran’s residents experienced an average of 30 units increase of Nitrogen Dixoide index 
in the year following the implementation of the gasoline sanction (2011), with the 
capitalization rate of 3.5 to 5.2 percent declines in their property values. Since the 
nominal price per square meter in 2011 was 20 million Rials ($1,300 in 2011 dollars), 
means approximate 700 to 1055 thousands Rials ($48 to $72 in 2011 dollars) reduction 
per square meter of housing.15 These numbers imply that the dramatic increase in air 
pollution due to sanctions is associated with approximately $11 to $16 billion dollars loss 
in the owner-occupied market. The cost will be larger if we were to include all other 
cities, especially large metropolitan regions of Iran. 
2.6 Conclusions 
This paper exploits a natural experiment to examine the economic value of air quality 
and infer the indirect costs of sanctions. The exogenous and heterogeneous increase in the 
level of NO2 combined with rich individual housing transactions data provide a set-up 
that mitigates econometrics concerns. One contribution of this research is that with this 
unique structure we examine agents’ responses to the variation in the level of the air 
quality in both purchasing and rental market within one city in the short run.  
We showed that air quality has a considerable impact on housing values. In fact, the 
dramatic increase in the level of air pollution in Tehran in 2010 is associated with an 
average of 3.5 to 5.2 percent decrease in housing prices. We also found significant 
                                                          
15 IRR-USD exchange change rate is approximately 15,000 for 2011. 
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reduction in rental prices, though the magnitudes were smaller. The panel analysis also 
reveals that more polluted neighborhoods are associated with lower price-rent ratio, that 
implies the impact of air pollution on the expectation of future capital gain. This study 
also provides evidence on marginal substitution between two markets. We find that the 
increase in the level of air pollution increases the odds of renting a purchased property. 
This paper is also the first to use hedonic approach to study one aspect of the indirect 
and environmental costs of sanctions. Based on a simple cost analysis, this incidence is 
responsible for the loss of 11 to 16 billion of 2011 dollars in the housing market only in 
Tehran. As these sorts of sanctions and restrictions are still common throughout the 
world, our paper can provide a better perspective of total welfare consequences of these 
policies. 
Our finding of different responses from rental and owner-occupant properties might 
be of interest for future studies that attempt to separate effects of policies on housing 
consumption and investments. Another extension of this paper is to look at the health 
impact of sanction-induced increase in air pollution, namely on child birth-weight or 
mortality of children and the elderly.  
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2.7  Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Monitors across Tehran 
Notes: This figure illustrates the location of 39 monitors across Tehran.  
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Figure 2.2: Concentration of Nitrogen Dioxide (𝑵𝑶𝟐) in Tehran 
Notes: This figure shows the average quarterly level of 𝑁𝑂2 measured in parts per billion based on daily readings of 
Tehran Air Quality monitors for years 2006 to 2016. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act was passed by U.S. Congress in July 2010 to restrict Iran’s import of gasoline. The red dashed line 
shows the annual standard for 𝑁𝑂2 set by U.S. EPA. The green dashed line shows the annual standard for 𝑁𝑂2 set by 
the European Union. 
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Figure 2.3: Concentration of Nitrogen Dioxide across Tehran 
Notes: This figure shows the heterogeneous variations in level of Nitrogen Dioxide between two districts in Tehran for 
years 2009 to 2014. Tehran is divided into 22 municipal regions. District 4, illustrated by the solid line, is located at the 
west side of Tehran. District 22, illustrated by the dashed line, is located at the east side of Tehran. Both districts are 
considered to be resided by urban middle class residents.  
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Figure 2.4: The Level of Pollution Index across Neighborhoods 
Notes: This figure shows the heterogeneous variations in level of distance-weighted pollution index across zip codes 
for two days; one year before (12/15/2009) and after (12/15/2011) the peak of the sanction-induced pollution jump. The 
figure includes zip code that contain sales record for both days. Dashed line shows the annual standard for 𝑁𝑂2 set by 
U.S. EPA. 
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Properties across Districts 
 
Notes: This table shows the number of housing transactions in each district for years 2009 -2014. Column (2) presents 
number of purchasing transactions. Column (3) presents number of rental transactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
District Owner-Occupant Market Rental-Housing Market
1 24,607 11,591
2 57,938 34,299
3 27,459 14,980
4 73,681 29,136
5 93,777 43,552
6 25,737 15,803
7 37,509 19,522
8 42,408 18,248
9 13,168 5,459
10 40,754 17,782
11 32,217 12,191
12 21,263 8,641
13 24,467 10,470
14 42,618 15,338
15 37,494 11,614
16 14,632 4,660
17 16,931 3,508
18 24,522 6,462
19 9,439 2,704
20 10,747 3,212
21 13,430 4,140
22 5,428 3,301
Total 690,226 296,613
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Notes: This Table presents the summary statistics for sample of residential properties transactions for years 2009 to 
2014. Rent and price values are deflated to reflect year 2015 prices using the Statistical Centre of Iran Housing Price 
Index. Each 5-digit zip code in the sample represents one neighborhood. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Owner-Occupant Market Rental-Housing Market
Mean Price per Square Meter (000 Rials) 43,654
Mean Rent per Square Meter (000 Rials) 3,130
Median Size (Square Meter) 72 71
Median Age (Year) 5 9
Number of Neighborhoods (5-digit zip codes) 1,710 1,699
Total Observations 690,217 296,613
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Table 2.3: The Impact of Air Pollution on Housing Prices 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for purchased transactions from years 2009 to 
2014. Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. All regressions are 
based on equation (2.1). The dependent variable is log of real price per-square meter. Pollution index is the daily 
inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For 
columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each 
transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one month 
before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution 
indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 5-digit zip-code, year, and 
seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include region trend fixed effects. Standard errors in all 
columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 
percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0349*** -0.0349*** -0.0416*** -0.0416*** -0.0520*** -0.0520***
(0.00191) (0.00191) (0.00219) (0.00219) (0.00241) (0.00240)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 648,776 648,776 648,606 648,606 647,000 647,000
R-squared 0.619 0.620 0.619 0.620 0.620 0.621
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table 2.4: The Impact of Air Pollution on Rental Prices 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on rental prices for rental transactions from years 2009 to 2014. 
Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. All regressions are based 
on equation (2.1). The dependent variable is log of total annual real rent per-square-meter. Pollution index is the daily 
inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For 
columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each 
transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one month 
before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution 
indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 5-digit zip-code, year, and 
seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include region trend fixed effects. Standard errors in all 
columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 
percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.00685** -0.00676** -0.00895*** -0.00886*** -0.0136*** -0.0134***
(0.00271) (0.00270) (0.00312) (0.00311) (0.00354) (0.00353)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 293,605 293,605 293,432 293,432 292,355 292,355
R-squared 0.408 0.411 0.408 0.411 0.408 0.411
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table 2.5: The Impact of Air Pollution on Price-Rent Ratio 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on price-rent ratio from years 2009 to 2014. All regressions are 
based on equation (2.1). Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. 
The dependent variable is zip code-day average price divided by average rent. Pollution index is the daily inverse 
distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns 
(1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each 
transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one month 
before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution 
indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 5-digit zip-code, year, and 
seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include region trend fixed effects. Standard errors in all 
columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 
percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0194*** -0.0192*** -0.0235*** -0.0233*** -0.0282*** -0.0282***
(0.00557) (0.00556) (0.00649) (0.00647) (0.00732) (0.00730)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 78,365 78,365 78,362 78,362 78,329 78,329
R-squared 0.156 0.158 0.156 0.158 0.156 0.158
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table 2.6: The Impact of Air Pollution on Housing Prices within 20 Months of the 
Pollution Spike 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for purchased transactions from years 2009 to 
2011. Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. All regressions are 
based on equation (2.1). The dependent variable is log of real price per-square meter. Pollution index is the daily 
inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For 
columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each 
transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one month 
before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution 
indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 5-digit zip-code, year, and 
seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include region trend fixed effects. Standard errors in all 
columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 
percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0477*** -0.0478*** -0.0531*** -0.0531*** -0.0573*** -0.0574***
(0.00218) (0.00217) (0.00240) (0.00238) (0.00249) (0.00247)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 353,645 353,645 353,475 353,475 351,869 351,869
R-squared 0.653 0.654 0.653 0.654 0.654 0.655
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table 2.7: The Impact of Air Pollution on Rental Prices 20 Months of the Pollution 
Spike 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on rental prices for rental transactions from years 2009 to 2014. 
Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. All regressions are based 
on equation (2.1). The dependent variable is log of total annual real rent per-square-meter. Pollution index is the daily 
inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For 
columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each 
transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one month 
before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution 
indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 5-digit zip-code, year, and 
seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include region trend fixed effects. Standard errors in all 
columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 
percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0113** -0.0113** -0.0167*** -0.0168*** -0.0212*** -0.0212***
(0.00451) (0.00449) (0.00515) (0.00512) (0.00571) (0.00568)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 96,542 96,542 96,369 96,369 95,292 95,292
R-squared 0.418 0.420 0.419 0.420 0.420 0.421
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table 2.8: Responses to Air Pollution by Size and Age (Owner-occupied Market) 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for purchased transactions from years 2009 to 
2014. Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. Columns 1, 4, 7, and 
10 report estimates from a version of equation (2.1) that includes interaction of pollution index and property age. 
Columns 2, 5, 8, and 11 report estimates from a version of equation (2.1) that includes interaction of pollution index 
and size. Columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 report estimates from a version of equation (2.1) that includes both interaction terms. 
The dependent variable is log of real price per-square meter. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-
average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1), (2), and (3), the 
Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For 
columns (4), (5), and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time 
of each transaction. For columns (7), (8), and (9), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for 
three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 5-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed 
effects. Standard errors in all columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * 
= 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pollution Index -0.0369*** -0.0717*** -0.0720*** -0.0434*** -0.0814*** -0.0814*** -0.0530*** -0.0915*** -0.0909***
(0.00217) (0.00459) (0.00459) (0.00248) (0.00498) (0.00497) (0.00273) (0.00524) (0.00524)
Pollution Index    Property Age 0.000268* 5.65e-05 0.000241 6.36e-06 0.000133 -0.000108
(0.000160) (0.000163) (0.000166) (0.000169) (0.000173) (0.000176)
Pollution Index    Property Size 0.000467*** 0.000466*** 0.000506*** 0.000506*** 0.000500*** 0.000503***
(5.59e-05) (5.65e-05) (6.00e-05) (6.06e-05) (6.14e-05) (6.22e-05)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X
Observations 648,776 648,776 648,776 648,606 648,606 648,606 647,000 647,000 647,000
R-squared 0.619 0.619 0.619 0.619 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
×
×
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Table 2.9: Responses to Air Pollution by Size and Age (Rental Market) 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for rental transactions from years 2009 to 2014. 
Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. Columns 1, 4, 7, and 10 
report estimates from a version of equation (2.1) that includes interaction of pollution index and property age. Columns 
2, 5, 8, and 11 report estimates from a version of equation (2.1) that includes interaction of pollution index and size. 
Columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 report estimates from a version of equation (2.1) that includes both interaction terms. The 
dependent variable is log of real price per-square meter. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average 
of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1), (2), and (3), the 
Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For 
columns (4), (5), and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time 
of each transaction. For columns (7), (8), and (9), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for 
three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 5-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed 
effects. Standard errors in all columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * 
= 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pollution Index -0.00804* -0.0546*** -0.0534*** -0.0113** -0.0612*** -0.0606*** -0.0197*** -0.0609*** -0.0633***
(0.00417) (0.00663) (0.00695) (0.00458) (0.00717) (0.00747) (0.00520) (0.00786) (0.00820)
Pollution Index    Property Age 0.000107 -0.000151 0.000211 -7.97e-05 0.000549* 0.000292
(0.000271) (0.000276) (0.000289) (0.000295) (0.000320) (0.000327)
Pollution Index    Property Size 0.000616*** 0.000622*** 0.000675*** 0.000678*** 0.000609*** 0.000598***
(7.82e-05) (7.94e-05) (8.32e-05) (8.47e-05) (8.93e-05) (9.11e-05)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X
Observations 293,605 293,605 293,605 293,432 293,432 293,432 292,355 292,355 292,355
R-squared 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.409 0.409
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
×
×
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Table 2.10: The Impact of Air Pollution on Housing Prices (New Constructions) 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for new construction transactions from years 
2009 to 2014. Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. All 
regressions are based on equation (2.1). The dependent variable is log of real price per-square meter. Pollution index is 
the daily inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each 
zipcode. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the 
time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one 
month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily 
pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 5-digit zip-code, year, 
and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include region trend fixed effects. Standard errors in all 
columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 
percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0308*** -0.0307*** -0.0356*** -0.0355*** -0.0452*** -0.0451***
(0.00364) (0.00363) (0.00412) (0.00412) (0.00429) (0.00428)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 116,051 116,051 116,017 116,017 115,783 115,783
R-squared 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.657
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table 2.11: The Impact of Air Pollution on Housing Prices Using Alternative 
Pollution Index 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices from years 2009 to 2014 for the sample of 
purchased properties that are located within 1 mile of at least one monitor. Observations within 2 months after and 
before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are also excluded. All regressions are based on equation (2.1). The dependent 
variable is log of real price per-square meter. For each observation, the pollution index is the daily reading of nitrogen 
dioxide concentration from a monitor that the housing observation lies within the one mile of the given monitor. If a 
housing observation is close to more than one monitor, the pollution index is the average of readings from all close 
monitors. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before 
the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for 
one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily 
pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 5-digit zip-code, year, 
and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include region trend fixed effects. Standard errors in all 
columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 
percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0178*** -0.0178*** -0.0231*** -0.0230*** -0.0314*** -0.0313***
(0.00366) (0.00366) (0.00400) (0.00400) (0.00400) (0.00400)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 130,009 130,009 129,995 129,995 129,836 129,836
R-squared 0.607 0.608 0.607 0.608 0.608 0.608
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table 2.12: The Impact of Air Pollution on Property Usage 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on probability of switching a owner-occupied property to non-
owner-occupied property by buyers. The sample covers all purchasing transactions from years 2009 to 2014, excluding 
observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010). All logit regressions are based on 
equation (2.2). The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if a purchased property turns to rental property, zero 
for all other cases. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest 
monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zip-code. The Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one 
week, one month, and three months before the time of each transaction for columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. All 
specifications include 5-digit zip-code, seasonal, and region-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors in all columns are 
clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent level. 
*** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
(1) (2) (3)
Pollution Index 0.0944*** 0.125*** 0.147***
(0.0246) (0.0278) (0.0302)
Year Fixed Effects X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X
Observations 648,764 648,594 646,988
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APPENDIX A FOR CHAPTER 1 
A.1 Proof of equation (1.5) in chapter 1 
In the absence of the size kink, Derivation of equation (2) with respect to size for marginal 
bunching person 𝐻𝐴 yields:  
 
𝑘𝐻
1
1−𝛿 = 
𝑠∗ + Δ𝑠
[𝛿𝑅0(1 − 𝜏0)]
𝛿
1−𝛿⁄
 (20) 
Since marginal bunching person 𝐻𝐴 is indifferent between 𝑠∗ and 𝑠𝐼, so 𝜋∗= 𝜋𝐼: 
 
𝜋∗ = 𝑅0𝑠
∗ − (
𝑠∗
𝑘𝐻
)
1
𝛿⁄
− 𝑝𝑙 (21) 
 
𝜋𝐼 = 𝑅1[𝑠
𝐼 − 𝑠∗](1 − 𝜏1) + 𝑠
∗𝑅0 − (
𝑠𝐼
𝑘𝐻
)
1
𝛿⁄
− 𝑝𝑙 − (1 − 𝛾)𝜑 (22) 
The first-order condition for 𝜋𝐼 yields to 𝑠𝐼 = 𝑘𝐻
1
1−𝛿[𝑅1(1 − 𝜏1)𝛿]
𝛿
1−𝛿 . Plugging this into 
(22), we have: 
 
𝜋𝐼 = 𝑘𝐻
1
1−𝛿[𝑅1(1 − 𝜏)]
1
1−𝛿𝛿
𝛿
1−𝛿 + 𝑠∗𝑅0 − 𝑠
∗𝑅1(1 − 𝜏) −  𝑘𝐻
1
1−𝛿[𝑅1(1 − 𝜏)]
1
1−𝛿𝛿
1
1−𝛿
− 𝑝𝑙 − (1 − 𝛾)𝜑 
= 𝑘𝐻
1
1−𝛿[𝑅1(1 − 𝜏)]
1
1−𝛿𝛿
𝛿
1−𝛿[1 − 𝛿] + 𝑠∗𝑅0 − 𝑠
∗𝑅1(1 − 𝜏) − 𝑝𝑙 − (1 − 𝛾)𝜑                
         
Moreover, plugging 𝑘𝐻
1
1−𝛿 from equation (20) into (21), we have:  
𝜋∗ =  𝑅0𝑠
∗ − 
(𝑠∗)
1
𝛿⁄
(𝑠∗ + ∆𝑠)
1−𝛿
𝛿
[ 𝑅0𝛿] − 𝑝𝑙 =   𝑅0𝑠
∗
[
 
 
 
 
1 − 
1
(1 + 
∆𝑠
𝑠∗
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1−𝛿
𝛿
𝛿
]
 
 
 
 
− 𝑝
𝑙
 
Similarly for 𝜋𝐼 we will have: 
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𝜋𝐼 = 
𝑠∗ + Δ𝑠
[𝛿𝑅0]
𝛿
1−𝛿⁄
[𝑅1(1 − 𝜏)]
1
1−𝛿𝛿
𝛿
1−𝛿[1 − 𝛿] + 𝑠∗𝑅0 − 𝑠
∗𝑅1(1 − 𝜏) − 𝑝𝑙 − (1 − 𝛾)𝜑
= 𝑅0(𝑠
∗ + Δ𝑠) [
 𝑅1(1 − 𝜏1)
 𝑅0
]
1
1−𝛿
[1 − 𝛿] + 𝑠∗𝑅0 − 𝑠
∗𝑅1(1 − 𝜏) − 𝑝𝑙
− (1 − 𝛾)𝜑 
Using the condition that 𝜋∗ = 𝜋𝐼: 
𝑅0(𝑠
∗ + Δ𝑠) [
 𝑅1(1 − 𝜏)
 𝑅0
]
1
1−𝛿
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Therefore: 
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1
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Using 𝜀𝑠 = 
𝛿
1−𝛿
 , we will have: 
1
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A.2 Details of Rental contracts in Tehran 
In Tehran, rent is typically paid in one of the three following forms. One form is called 
full “Rahn” in which tenant deposits money for the whole period of the lease and will 
receive the same exact amount of money back at the time of lease expiration. There is a 
straightforward rule to convert the value of the “Rahn” (deposit) to monthly rent and vice 
versa. In fact, for each 10,000,000 Rials “Rahn”, one can pay 300,000 Rials monthly rent 
instead.
16
  It implies that the interest of the money is 3% a month. Therefore, the interest 
of 10,000,000 Rials is equal to 300,000 Rials a month, which is the rent here. The Second 
form is full rent in which the tenant pays a specific amount on a monthly basis and there 
is no “Rahn” involved. The last form is a combination of the first two in which the tenant 
pays monthly rent in addition to the initial deposit money. An example can illustrate 
better how rents can be paid in these three forms. Consider an apartment of 120𝑚2 
located in downtown Tehran. The landlord can either ask for an upfront deposit of 500 
million Rials for a year, the amount that she has to return to the tenant at the end of the 
year, or instead, she can ask for 15 million Rials monthly rent for 12 months (180 million 
Rials annually).  Alternatively, she can ask for a combination of a “Rahn” (deposit) of 
100 million Rials and 12 million Rials of monthly rent. In the empirical analysis, “Rahn”s 
are converted to rent and total annual rent is used for all estimations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16  In 2015, the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar was 34,000 Rials. 
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Panel A.  
 
Panel B.  
 
Figure A.1 Apartments Distribution and the Taxation Point (Rental Market) 
This figure displays the histogram of apartments size (by 3𝑚2 bins). It includes all observations from March 2012- to 
September 2014 for the segment (120𝑚2, 180𝑚2). The solid line shows the starting point of taxation. The solid line 
itself belongs to the tax-zero side of the kink. Panel B. presents the same histogram using logarithmic scale. The dashed 
line displays the polynomial fit of degree of five. 
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Figure A.2 Apartments Distribution and the Taxation Point (Matched data) 
This figure displays the apartments distribution (by 5𝑚2 bins) for reduced sample of apartments that have been both 
sold and rent. It includes all observations from March 2012- September 2014 for segment (120𝑚2, 180𝑚2). The solid 
line shows the starting point of taxation. The solid line itself belongs to the tax-zero side of the kink. The dashed line 
display the polynomial fit of degree of five. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
8
0
0
1
0
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
A
p
a
rt
m
e
n
ts
125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 175
Size (Square Meter)
Rental Apartments Polynomial Fit of Degree 5
88 
 
 
Figure A.3 Apartments Distribution in the Owning Market (Entire Sample) 
This figure displays the density of apartments by 5𝑚2 bins in the owner-occupant market. The histogram includes all 
purchasing transactions from March 2012- September 2014. The dashed line displays the polynomial fit of degree of 5 
for newly built apartments. The solid line shows the starting point of taxation. The line itself is on the tax-zero side of 
the kink.  
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Table A.1:  Placebo Tests Using Falsified Dummy Variables 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is log of annual real rent per square meter in thousands of Rials. Regressions are based 
on equation (19). SizeKink is a dummy variable equal to one for properties larger than 150𝒎𝟐. Kink130, Kink140, 
Kink160, and Kink170 are falsified dummy variables that get value of one for apartments larger than 130𝒎𝟐, 
140𝒎𝟐, 160𝒎𝟐, and 170𝒎𝟐, respectively, and zero otherwise.  All specifications include 5-digit ZIP Code, year, and 
seasonal fixed effects. Standard errors in all columns are clustered by 5-digit ZIP Code and stars indicate statistical 
significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent level, *** = 1 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Size > Cutoff 69.72 64.67 63.34 44.66 44.30 68.74 124.61 65.72
(50.40) (55.23) (59.23) (65.34) (109.49) (115.74) (121.52) (126.78)
(Size > Cutoff) × (Size - Cutoff ) 2.53 10.12 -13.70 33.80
(10.43) (12.76) (22.64) (24.98)
Observations 11,423 11,423 8,500 8,500 3,629 3,629 2,855 2,855
R-squared 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.59
(160      - 180      )
Rent/
Cutoff at 130 Cutoff at 140 Cutoff at 160 Cutoff at 170
(120      - 140      )
Rent/
(130      - 150      )
Rent/ Rent/
(150      - 170      )𝑚2𝑚2
𝑚2
𝑚2𝑚2
𝑚2
𝑚2𝑚2
𝑚2
𝑚2𝑚2
𝑚2
𝑚2 𝑚2 𝑚2 𝑚2
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APPENDIX B FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
Figure B.1: The Level of One Month Average of Pollution Index across 
Neighborhoods 
Notes: This figure shows the heterogeneous variations in level of distance-weighted pollution index across zip codes 
for two days; one year before and after the peak of the sanction-induced pollution jump. The figure includes 1166 zip 
code that contain sales record for both months. Dashed line shows the annual standard for 𝑁𝑂2 set by U.S. EPA. 
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Table B.1: Baseline Regression Including Months of Increase (Housing Prices) 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for purchased transactions from years 2009 to 
2014. All regressions are based on equation (2.1). The dependent variable is log of real price per-square meter. 
Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 
𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one 
week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily 
pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is 
average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 
5-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include region trend fixed effects. 
Standard errors in all columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 
percent level, ** = 5 percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0352*** -0.0352*** -0.0426*** -0.0426*** -0.0550*** -0.0550***
(0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00167) (0.00167) (0.00194) (0.00194)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 690,223 690,223 690,053 690,053 688,447 688,447
R-squared 0.617 0.618 0.617 0.618 0.618 0.619
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table B.2: Baseline Regression Including Months of Increase (Rental Price) 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on rental prices for rental transactions from years 2009 to 2014. 
All regressions are based on equation (2.1). The dependent variable is log of total annual real rent per-square-meter. 
Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 
𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one 
week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily 
pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is 
average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 
5-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include region trend fixed effects. 
Standard errors in all columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 
percent level, ** = 5 percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.00201 -0.00198 -0.00326 -0.00322 -0.00725** -0.00715**
(0.00255) (0.00254) (0.00292) (0.00291) (0.00332) (0.00330)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 296,612 296,612 296,439 296,439 295,362 295,362
R-squared 0.409 0.411 0.409 0.411 0.409 0.412
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table B.3: Panel Analysis Including Months of Increase 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on price-rent ratio from years 2009 to 2014. All regressions are 
based on equation (2.1). The dependent variable is zip code-day average price divided by average rent. Pollution index 
is the daily inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each 
zipcode. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the 
time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one 
month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily 
pollution indices for three month before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 5-digit zip-code, year, 
and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include region trend fixed effects. Standard errors in all 
columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 
percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0257*** -0.0255*** -0.0308*** -0.0307*** -0.0372*** -0.0372***
(0.00512) (0.00511) (0.00601) (0.00599) (0.00687) (0.00687)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 79,292 79,292 79,289 79,289 79,256 79,256
R-squared 0.156 0.158 0.156 0.158 0.156 0.158
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table B.4: The Impact of Air Pollution on Housing Prices Using Alternative 
Pollution Index (Half Mile) 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices from years 2009 to 2014 for the sample of 
purchased properties that are located within half mile of at least one monitor. Observations within 2 months after and 
before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are also excluded. All regressions are based on equation (2.1). The dependent 
variable is log of real price per-square meter. For each observation, the pollution index is the daily reading of nitrogen 
dioxide concentration from a monitor that the housing observation lies within the one-half mile of the given monitor. If 
a housing observation is close to more than one monitor, the pollution index is the average of readings from all close 
monitors. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before 
the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for 
one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily 
pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 5-digit zip-code, year, 
and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include region trend fixed effects. Standard errors in all 
columns are clustered by 5-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 
percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0153** -0.0153** -0.0241*** -0.0242*** -0.0330*** -0.0332***
(0.00669) (0.00670) (0.00760) (0.00756) (0.00782) (0.00774)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 34,081 34,081 34,077 34,077 34,031 34,031
R-squared 0.617 0.617 0.617 0.618 0.617 0.618
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
